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Expanding the Arsenal Against Biopiracy:
Application of the Concession Agreement
Framework to Prevent Misappropriation
of Biodiversity
Tak Jong Kim*
INTRODUCTION: THE FAADE OF EQUITABLE BENEFIT SHARING
IN MODERN BIOPROSPECTING
Those who cannot learn from History are condemned to repeat it. Those
who fail to negotiate are condemned by History.
-Srividhya Ragavan'
In its most basic form, bioprospecting is a scientific and commercial
research paradigm in which bioprospectors explore secluded locations in or-
der to find "new drugs and new foodstuffs from exotic plants and animals."2
Usually from developed countries, bioprospectors derive genetic and bio-
chemical materials that are both scientifically and commercially valuable,
and they subsequently patent these materials abroad to justify legal owner-
ship through intellectual property law.3 Although the chances of discovering
useful genetic and biochemical materials through this bioprospecting para-
digm are low, the rewards of a successful venture are highly lucrative and
J.D., May 2010, American University, Washington College of Law; M.Eng.,
Jan. 2006, Cornell University, College of Engineering; B.S., Jan. 2005, Cornell
University, College of Agriculture and Life Sciences. I am grateful for the
thoughts and guidance of Professors Sean Flynn, Fred Provorny, Christine Far-
ley, Peter Jaszi, and Josh Sarnoff.
1. Srividhya Ragavan, New Paradigms for Protection of Biodiversity, 13 J. IN-
TELL. PROP. RTS. 514, 514 (2008) (expanding on the famous quote by
Santayana George in his influential work, The Life of Reason).
2. See Maggie Kohls, Blackbeard or Albert Schweitzer: Reconciling Biopiracy, 6
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 108, 108 (2007) (summarizing the objectives of
various critics of bioprospecting and their proposed approaches to meet those
objectives).
3. See Elizabeth Longacre, Advancing Science While Protecting Developing
Countries from Exploitation of Their Resources and Knowledge, 13 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & Er. L.J. 963, 966 (2003) (discussing how to justly
allocate rights over the use of biodiversity and traditional knowledge and to
promote scientific innovations).
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may contribute significantly toward scientific advancements. 4 Yet those who
oppose bioprospecting label it derogatively as "biopiracy."5
Beneath the veil of optimism in discovering a completely new type of
food or a breakthrough cure for a deadly disease, bioprospecting can harbor
fundamental issues of injustice and unfairness.6 Professor Vandana Shiva
explains that "[flive hundred years after Columbus, a more secular version of
the same project of colonization continues through patents and intellectual
property rights . . . . The creation of property through piracy of others'
wealth remains the same as 500 years ago."7
Undoubtedly, bioprospecting is about wealth; however, its ramifications
are not limited to wrongful wealth-creation alone.8 Bioprospecting is intri-
cately tied to the larger global debates on the preservation of traditional
4. See Kohls, supra note 2, at 112 (explaining that while the probability of finding
an exotic plant with true medicinal properties are between one in 10,000 to
50,000, and the potential market value for such finds is worth billions of
dollars).
5. Id. at 108-09; see also Burton Ong, Harnessing the Biological Bounty of Na-
ture: Mapping the Wilderness of Legal, Socio-Cultural, Geo-Political and En-
vironmental Issues, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES
1, 7 (Burton Ong ed., 2004) (recognizing that the lack of a definitive definition
of "biopiracy" among the bioprospecting opponents is one of their problems).
But see Nancy Kremers, Speaking with a Forked Tongue in the Global Debate
on Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources: Are U.S. Intellectual Prop-
erty Law and Policy Really Aimed at Meaningful Protection for Native Ameri-
can Cultures?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 19 (2004)
(limiting "biopiracy" to "illegitimate appropriation and commercialization of
human, plant, and other genetic material without the informed consent of its
owners or traditional custodians," emphasis added); see VANDANA SHIVA, PRO-
TECT OF PLUNDER?: UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 49
(Zed Books Ltd. 2001) (defining "biopiracy" as "the use of intellectual prop-
erty systems to legitimize the exclusive ownership and control over biological
resources ... products ... and processes that have been used over centuries in
non-industrialized cultures").
6. See Sudhir D. Ghatnekar & Mandar S. Ghatnekar, Bio-Prospecting or Bio-
Piracy?, INDIAN EXPRESS NEWSPAPER, Feb. 8, 1999, http://www.expressindia.
com/news/fe/daily/19990208/fecO801I .html (arguing that the developing coun-
tries must take the initiative to conserve their biodiversity against "foreign
hands").
7. VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 2
(South End Press 1997) (asserting that while the modem "project of coloniza-
tion" is carried out under a different legal mandate, by different actors, for
different natural resources, and through different doctrines, the underlying ra-
tionale remains unchanged as the desire to exploit for gain).
8. E.g., Ghatnekar & Ghatnekar, supra note 6 (noting that the estimated global
profits from commercial products derived from bioprospecting can be as high
as $50 billion).
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knowledge and lifestyle, conservation of natural resources, benefit-sharing,
scientific innovation, and moral responsibility.9 The potential injustice and
unfairness of bioprospecting can impact each of these concerns at multiple
levels of society, from the individual to the entire world. Thus, it is impera-
tive that bioprospecting must not become biopiracy.10
Nevertheless, examples of biopiracy are numerous. 1 Presently, there
are various legal mechanisms that exist to address this undesirable aspect of
bioprospecting,12 but biopiracy continues in more insidious ways under the
faqade of equitable benefit-sharing. One example is the patent-based agree-
ment between the indigenous people of the Peruvian Amazon, the Aguaruna,
and Washington University in St. Louis, collaborating with the Monsanto
Company and the U.S. government. 3 In this benefit-sharing agreement, the
Aguaruna permitted Washington University to bioprospect on their lands and
to access their traditional knowledge in return for a 25% royalty fee. 14 But
25% of what? This 25% royalty fee represented a quarter share of Washing-
ton University's one percent royalty from Monsanto's profits derived from
any patented products based on Aguaruna's genetic resources and traditional
9. See Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric of Biopiracy, I I CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
519, 519-20 (2003) (analyzing the rhetoric used by advocates for indigenous
groups); see also Hanns Ullrich, Traditional Knowledge, Biodiversity, Benefit-
Sharing and the Patent System: Romantics v. Economics? 3 (EUI Working
Paper LAW No. 2005/07, 2005), available at http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bit
stream/1814/3327/1/law05-07.pdf (noting that the "defense" movement
against expanding intellectual property began at the United Nations Conference
on the Environment and Development of Rio de Janeiro in 1992).
10. See, e.g., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, BOOKLET No. 2, 1 [hereinafter
BOOKLET No. 2] available at http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/tk/920/
wipo-pub_920.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2010) (stating that protecting traditional
knowledge is not just about protecting the knowledge itself but also the indige-
nous communities' cultural values, ways of life, and sustainable development).
11. See, e.g., Nancy Kremers, Speaking with a Forked Tongue in the Global De-
bate on Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources: Are U.S. Intellectual
Property Law and Policy Really Aimed at Meaningful Protection for Native
American Cultures?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 19,
27-33 (2004) (summarizing the famous cases of biopiracy involving tumeric,
neem, ayahusaca, and hoodia).
12. See infra Part II (discussing the various legal mechanisms that are currently
available to combat biopiracy).
13. GRAIN, Biodiversity for Sale: Dismantling the Hype about Benefit Sharing,
Apr. 2000, http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id= 134 [hereinafter GRAIN-I] (last
visited Oct. 5, 2010).
14. Id. (stating that the royalty figures often quote a percentage of an undefined
whole or a sub-percentage of an unknown fraction of product sales).
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knowledge.15 In other words, the Aguaruna would receive only a meager
0.25% royalty.
Today, this fagade of equitable benefit-sharing is taking on greater com-
plexity, and thus, becoming much harder to detect. The highly praised bi-
oprospecting bilateral agreement between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Instituto
Nacional de Biodiversidad of Costa Rica (INBio) is illustrative. In this two-
year agreement, INBio collected biological samples from Costa Rica's
rainforests for Merck's drug-screening program.16 In exchange, Merck
agreed to a benefit-sharing regime that involved a $1.135 million research
budget, royalty payments on any resulting commercial products, and techni-
cal assistance and training of INBio's staff.17 This benefit-sharing regime,
however, is hardly equitable. Considering that Costa Rica's rainforests hold
roughly 5-7% of the world's biodiversity, if the Merck/INBio bioprospecting
agreement were widely replicated, the world's biodiversity would be "auc-
tioned off for the paltry sum of [approximately] $10 million per annum."18 It
is easy to understand, therefore, why some critics of the Merck/INBio bi-
oprospecting agreement call INBio a "'Trojan Horse' that international 'bi-
opirates' use to gain entrance to the country to plunder its riches."'9
Biopiracy persists today in increasingly sophisticated ways despite the
arsenal of legal mechanisms that exist to defend against it. As this arsenal
expands, this paper argues that the concession agreement framework should
play a substantial role in addressing the issues of injustice and unfairness that
may arise in bioprospecting. This discussion focuses narrowly on biopros-
pecting as it relates to patents on genetic resources and not on traditional
knowledge due to its diminished significance in the modern bioprospecting
paradigm.20 Part I briefly examines the background of biopiracy.21 Part II
surveys the various legal mechanisms advanced by the opponents of bi-
opiracy, and it also discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each
15. Id. (opining that some methods of royalty calculations are deliberately
confusing).
16. Latin American Alliance, Bioprospecting/Biopiracy and Indigenous Peoples,
available at www.iphandbook.org/jforum/posts/downloadAttach/442.page (last
visited Nov. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Latin American Alliance].
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Roger Hamilton, Bioprospecting, with No Apologies, IDBAMERICA, Apr. 2004,
http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/index.cfm?thisid=2705.
20. Infra Part I.C; see also Kohls, supra note 2, at 110 (noting that folksongs,
crafts, and tribal insignias are subjects of other areas of legal regime, such as
copyright law).
21. See infra Part I (outlining the fundamental issues in biopiracy and its broader
implications).
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mechanism.22 Part III argues that a direct, bilateral agreement in the form of
a concession agreement between the bioprospectors and the holders of the
genetic resources (GR-holders) can address some of the issues of unfairness
and injustice in bioprospecting.23 Part IV outlines considerations that may
hinder the application of the concession agreement framework.24 While there
is no single solution to prevent biopiracy, this paper concludes that the con-
cession agreement framework should become an important tool to empower
the GR-holders who are seeking to protect their natural resources against
biopiracy.
I. FROM BIOPROSPECTING TO BIoPIRAcY: UNDERSTANDING THE
MODERN BIOPROSPECTING PARADIGM
You never know what you're going to find or where you're going to find
it... Nothing's off limits.25
-Margann Miller- Wideman,
Spokesperson for The Monsanto Company
Bioprospecting is a relatively recent phenomenon that owes its contro-
versial emergence into the global intellectual property debate to the rapid
development of the biotechnology industry.26 Today, the lucrative commer-
cial exploitation of biotechnological innovations has led both industrial and
academic entities to search nature, the "cornucopian repository of valuable
... genetic resources,"27 and to gather potentially useful biological resources
from all over the world.28 These biological resources are the raw materials
that fuel the modern biotechnology industry.29
22. See infra Part II (explaining the "positive protection" and "defensive protec-
tion" mechanisms available to address the concerns in bioprospecting).
23. See infra Part III (advocating the use of concession agreements because it ef-
fectively addresses the unique needs of an extractive industry, such as
bioprospecting).
24. See infra Part IV (focusing on the weakness of the concession agreement
framework concerning permanent sovereignty and the long-term exclusivity).
25. Latin American Alliance, supra note 16.
26. BURTON ONG, HARNESSING THE BIOLOGICAL BOUNTY OF NATURE: MAPPING
THE WILDERNESS OF LEGAL, SOCIO-CULTURAL, GEo-POLTICAL AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL ISSUES, IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 1,
1-2 (Burton Ong ed., 2004) at 1-2 (noting the significant development of the
biotechnology industry since the early 1980s).
27. Id. at 1.
28. See id.
29. See S.K. Verma, Plant Genetic Resources, Biological Inventions and Intellec-
tual Property Rights: The Case of India, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND Bio-
LOGICAL RESOURCES 128, 130-31 (Burton Ong ed., 2004) (estimating that
2010]
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To facilitate their search for biological resources, the bioprospectors fre-
quently turn for assistance to the segments of local communities who possess
intimate, traditional knowledge of the natural world.30 Hence, in biopros-
pecting, the seemingly distinct concepts of genetic resources and traditional
knowledge are intricately intertwined.3' Specifically, genetic resources are
found within a geographic region's biodiversity, which is defined as "the
variability among living organisms from all sources . . . within species, be-
tween species and of ecosystems." 32 The scope of this definition encom-
passes billions of genetic resources, but only a few may possess
commercially or scientifically valuable properties.33 This reality presents
prohibitively time-consuming and costly challenges for the bioprospectors,
who must screen the entire biodiversity of a large geographic region for those
rare and potentially useful genetic resources. 34
Fortunately for the bioprospectors, traditional knowledge of the region's
indigenous communities can help mitigate some of the challenges of biopros-
pecting by providing a "broad range of 'indigenous' works ranging from
folklore to shamanic knowledge" that narrows the scope of the search to-
wards only the most promising genetic resources. 35 In this function, tradi-
6.5% of all genetic research is focused upon germplasm found in nature and
roughly 80% of the world population depends on medicine derived from botan-
ical sources).
30. ONG, supra note 26, at 1-2 (elaborating that the local communities may include
traditional healers, herbalists, farmers, and plant/animal breeders).
31. Emanuela Arezzo, Struggling Around the "Natural" Divide: The Protection of
Tangible and Intangible Indigenous Property, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
367, 372 (2007) (analyzing the current normative framework and the interna-
tional debates surrounding the protection of genetic resources and the associ-
ated traditional knowledge).
32. See Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 2, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818,
[hereinafter CBD] available at http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.
shtml (defining various terms used in the CBD).
33. See generally, Gertrui Van Overwalle, Protecting and Sharing Biodiversity and
Traditional Knowledge: Holder and User Tools, 53 EcOLOGICAL EcON. 585,
585 (2005) (evaluating current intellectual property protection systems, intel-
lectual property-like regimes, and protection and sharing initiatives outside the
intellectual property frameworks).
34. Arezzo, supra note 31, at 372 (opining that while tropical regions, such as in
Brazil and Peru, may harness vast treasures of useful exotic plants and animals,
those potentials remain dormant if the bioprospectors cannot find them).
35. Id. at 370-71 (describing that traditional knowledge encompasses not only the
fruits of an intergenerational creative process, but also shamanic knowledge,
rituals, dances, and songs, handed down orally). But see generally, Murray L.
Eiland, Patenting Traditional Medicine, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y
45, 51 (2007) (stating that there is no consensus on the precise definition of
traditional knowledge).
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tional knowledge is equally valuable to the bioprospectors as the genetic
resource itself because it entails information on the use of biodiversity, which
makes bioprospecting an economically feasible paradigm.36 It is in this con-
text where the bioprospectors associate with these other stakeholders that
form the backdrop of biopiracy.37
A. Scope of the Paper: Dissociating Genetic Resources from
Traditional Knowledge
Undoubtedly, traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources is
an important part of bioprospecting and thus, important in any discussion of
biopiracy. However, this paper explores biopiracy much more specifically as
it relates to the misappropriation of genetic resources, and therefore distin-
guishes the entangled concepts of genetic resources and traditional knowl-
edge. It is important to note that this focus on genetic resources in no way
undermines the significance of traditional knowledge, which represents the
technical know-how and ecological, scientific, or medical knowledge in ad-
dressing biopiracy. Instead, the decision to narrow the scope of the discus-
sion to the misappropriation of genetic resources is the result of the modern
paradigm of bioprospecting that relies less and less on traditional knowledge.
Bioprospecting in the 21st century is a highly systemized process. The
traditional-and arguably romantic-paradigm of bioprospecting that in-
volves adventurous bioprospectors rummaging the remote rainforests of the
world and interviewing indigenous tribes for valuable genetic resources
rarely takes place today.38 Rather, modern bioprospecting consists of three
distinct steps: 1) protection of diversity, 2) collection, and 3) research and
development of the biological samples.39 The second step involves the col-
lection of biological samples, also known as "sample-hunting,"40 which is
often carried out by local institutions that have ready access to the sites of
36. See Arezzo, supra note 31, at 372-73 (noting that traditional knowledge facili-
tates foreign corporations to invest in large research projects where successful
outcomes are extremely uncertain).
37. See BOOKLET No. 2, supra note 10, at 1-2 (explaining that at the heart of
biopiracy is the misappropriation of genetic resources AND traditional knowl-
edge and the lack of recognition for the GR-holder's contributions).
38. See Heald, supra note 9, at 520-21 (outlining two different scenarios that illus-
trate bioprospecting behaviors of foreign companies that may constitute as
"biopiracy").
39. GRAIN, Bargaining Over the Benefits of Biodiversity, SEEDLING, (October
1993), http://www.grain.org/seedling/?id=382 [hereinafter GRAIN-2] (last vis-
ited Jan. 4, 2010).
40. Id.
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great biodiversity instead of the foreign bioprospectors. 41 These locally
based collectors can be universities,42 private entities,43 or government and
non-governmental organizations. 44 The collection strategies can be random,
"targeted to certain species, or solely directed to local people's pharmaco-
poeia."45 By way of example, the National Cancer Institute randomly col-
lected over 35,000 plant samples between 1956 and 1976.46 Further, the
sheer amount of biological samples collected is even more impressive for
bioprospectors who focus on micro-organisms. For instance, the U.S. bio-
technology firm, Diversa Corporation,47 boasts that it has collected genes for
over three million microorganisms.48
The second step is screening, defined as a "preliminary procedure, such
as a test or examination, to detect the most characteristic sign or signs of a
disorder specific or desired characteristic ... that may require further investi-
gation."49 After receiving the biological samples from local institutions, the
foreign bioprospectors proceed to screen hundreds of thousands of samples
to identify valuable and potentially useful genetic resources. In the past,
screening massive amounts of samples was prohibitively time-consuming
and costly for the bioprospectors, and thus, traditional knowledge served as
critical "filters" that enhanced the effectiveness of the screening process. 50
41. See id. (noting that in addition to collecting samples, the local institutions may
also taxonomically identify the biological samples for the foreign
bioprosectors).
42. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Neil A. Belson, President and Founder,
NewAgriculture, Inc. (Nov. 7, 2009) (explaining that NewAgriculture's prede-
cessor biotechnology firm, Pharmacogenetics, Inc., partnered with the Central
University of Ecuador to collect biological samples from the rainforests of
Ecuador).
43. Latin American Alliance, supra note 16.
44. Id. (explaining that such governmental and non-governmental organizations in-
clude scientific research institutes, conservation/environmental groups, and
public sector institutions).
45. GRAIN-2, supra note 39.
46. Latin American Alliance, supra note 16
47. About: History & Milestones, VERENIUM.COM, http://www.verenium.com/about
_history.asp (last visited Jan. 9, 2010) (noting that in 2007, Diversa Corpora-
tion merged with Celunol Corporation to form the Verenium Corporation).
48. GRAIN, Sprouting Up: Diversa Dominates Global Search for Blockbuster Mi-
crobes, SEEDLING, (Jan. 2005), http://www.grain.org/seedling/?id=316 [herein-
after GRAIN-3].
49. Screening Definition, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://medical-dictionary.the
freedictionary.com/screening (last visited Oct. 2, 2010) (citing from MosBY'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY (8th ed., 2009).
50. See Latin American Alliance, supra note 16 (reporting that the U.S.-based
company, Shaman Pharmaceuticals, Inc., opined that traditional knowledge
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However, "with advances in molecular biology and the availability of more
sophisticated high-throughput diagnostic tools for screening," mass sampling
has now become cost-effective.5l Diversa Corporation, for example, claims
to be able to screen a billion genes from micro-organisms per day in search
of promising microbial enzymes. 52 This rate of screening is phenomenal, and
in the modem bioprospecting paradigm, it effectively decreases the signifi-
cance of traditional knowledge.
Research and development of the genetic resources displaying useful
and valuable properties represents the third step of modern bioprospecting.53
By this final step, however, the collection activity is already complete.54 The
genetic resources are removed from their geographic regions of origin, and
the research and development is carried out almost exclusively in the indus-
trialized North, the home countries of the foreign bioprospectors. 55
In essence, one way of characterizing the modern bioprospecting para-
digm is that it is a converse of the traditional paradigm. In the traditional
bioprospecting paradigm, the knowledge of the useful properties of genetic
resource, embodied in the traditional knowledge of the indigenous communi-
ties, led the bioprospectors to a specific genetic resource. In contrast, in the
modem bioprospecting paradigm, the genetic resource itself is the source of
the knowledge of its useful properties, which is revealed through sampling
and screening. This paradigmatic reversal, which all but removes the need
for traditional knowledge in bioprospecting, is an outcome of both necessity
and choice. Today, the focus of most natural products' research involves
made bioprospecting "5,000 times more effective than random collection" of
biological samples); see, e.g., Ragavan, supra note 1, at 515 (noting that the
largest plant sample collection program conducted by the National Cancer In-
stitute was terminated in 1981 because of its failure to identify a greater num-
ber of new anti-cancer agents through mass sampling and screening); Cf. Axt,
Josephine R. et. al., Biotechnology, Indigenous Peoples, and Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, Washington D.C., UNT Digital Library. http://digital.library.unt.
edu/ark:/67531/metacrs8l76/. (last visited Oct. 2, 2010) (opining that had the
National Cancer Institute used traditional knowledge, the program's success
rate would have doubled).
51. Latin American Alliance, supra note 16.
52. GRAIN-3, supra note 48.
53. GRAIN-2, supra note 39.
54. See Ragavan, supra note 1, at 515 (explaining that this step involves, "experi-
mentation, appreciation of the resources and understanding the prevailing tradi-
tional knowledge over the resources").
55. GRAIN-2, supra note 39 (noting that in the past thirty years, over 90% of all
new pharmaceuticals research and development has taken place in the OECD
countries of the industrialized North).
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SMU Science and Technology Law Review
microbial sources rather than plant or animal sources.56 A sample of dirt
from a tropical rainforest contains thousands of microorganisms, and there is
little traditional knowledge concerning these tiny organisms that are invisible
to the naked eye.5 7 Hence, mass sampling and screening is necessary for the
bioprospectors simply because they do not know what it is that they are look-
ing for.58 At the same time, continuous advances in cost-effective and effi-
cient screening technologies necessitate their use in lieu of the traditional
knowledge of the indigenous communities.
Moreover, the modern bioprospecting paradigm represents the deliber-
ate choices of the bioprospectors, who are choosing to avoid the hurdles of
bioprospecting laws enacted in many countries to fight biopiracy.59 In so
doing, the bioprospectors are shifting their focus to marine environments
where only a few countries have specific "legislation regulating access to and
exploitation of . . . their marine ...and other genetic resources."60 More
importantly, the bioprospectors are choosing to avoid traditional knowledge
because the use of such knowledge inevitably will involve the indigenous
communities. As Mark Plotkin, president of the Amazon Conservation Team
and research associate at the Smithsonian Institution's Museum of Natural
History, bluntly stated, "the corporations [bioprospectors] don't want the
headaches of dealing with them [the indigenous communities]."61
Due to the modern realities of bioprospecting, the scope of this paper is
limited to the misappropriation of genetic resources only. Traditional knowl-
edge is an important aspect of bioprospecting and in preventing biopiracy,
and therefore, it is impossible to completely segregate genetic resources from
the associated traditional knowledge. But the primary aim of this paper is to
introduce a new legal mechanism to prevent misappropriation of genetic re-
56. Id. (attributing one possible reason as the ease of which microorganisms can be
readily cultured in a lab without the need to return to the geographical source
again to retrieve the biological sample).
57. Id.
58. GRAIN-3, supra note 48.
59. See, e.g., Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Costa Rica. Biodiversity
Law No.7788, Apr. 23, 1998), http://www.grain.org/brl_files/costarica-biodi-
versitylaw- I 998-en.pdf [hereinafter Biodiversity Law No.7788] (promoting bi-
oprospecting and deterring biopiracy in three ways: I) regulating access to the
biological resources, 2) limiting the scope of the intellectual property rights to
the bioprospectors, and 3) imposing severe sanctions for unauthorized access to
the biological resources).
60. Terry Collins, Clear Rules Needed to Govern Deep Sea Bioprospecting: UNU,
EUREKALERT!, June 8, 2005, http://www.eurekalert.org/pub-releases/2005-06/
unu-crn060105.php.
61. See Searching for Nature's Medicines, ACTiONBIOSENCE.ORG, http://www.ac-
tionbioscience.org/biodiversity/plotkin.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2010) (inter-
viewing Mark J. Plotkin on the crucial need to protect biodiversity as a
repository of medicine, knowledge, and models for medical research).
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sources in the context of the modern bioprospecting paradigm where tradi-
tional knowledge has diminished significance.
B. Explaining Biopiracy: The Misappropriation of Genetic Resources
"Biopiracy" is not a term of art with an accepted legal meaning.62 There
is no definitive working definition of the term shared by scholars, commenta-
tors, politicians, and NGOs, who each define the term in slightly different
ways.63 However, these various definitions of biopiracy can be categorized
into two broad types, namely, "critical" and "legalistic."64 The critical defi-
nition characterizes biopiracy generally and emphasizes the larger questions
of equity.65 For instance, Professor Graham Dutfield defines biopiracy as the
"ways that corporations from the developed world claim ownership of, free
ride on, or otherwise take unfair advantage of, the genetic resources and
traditional knowledge and technologies of developing countries."66 While
this critical definition effectively highlights the problems that can transform
legitimate bioprospecting into biopiracy,67 it omits the mechanism through
which the bioprospectors, and thus, the corporate and academic entities from
the developed countries take unfair advantage of the developing countries.
The legalistic definition supplements the critical definition by introducing the
role that the intellectual property law has in perpetuating biopiracy. A repre-
sentative legalistic definition comes from Professor Shiva who defines bi-
opiracy as the "use of intellectual property systems to legitimize the
exclusive ownership and control over biological resources ... products...
62. Ong, supra note 26, at 7; see also IKECHI MGBEOJI, GLOBAL BIOPIRACY: PAT-
ENTS, PLANTS, AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE 68 (UBC Press, 2006) (stating
that the term "biopiracy" was coined by a Canadian activist, Pat Mooney); see
also, Graham Dutfield, What is Biopiracy?, in EXPERT INTERNATIONAL WORK-
SHOP ON ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING: RECORD OF DISCUSSION, Cuernava,
Mexico, October 24-27, 2004, 89-92, (Mariana Bellot-Rojas & Sophie Bernier
eds., 2005) (opining that the term has "strategic vagueness" that may not help
those working toward a legal solution to biopiracy).
63. See, e.g., Kohls, supra note 2, at 108-09 (providing a representative list of
various definitions of biopiracy that are currently being used by various "bio-
opponents").
64. Crucible II Group, SEEDING SOLUTIONS: VOLUME I (IDRC, 2000), http://www.
idrc.ca/en/ev-64405-201-I-DOTOPIC.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2009) (noting
a third category of definition, "industry," which emphasizes the role of the
bioprospectors in biopiracy).
65. See id.
66. Dutfield, supra note 62, at 89. (opining that the term has "strategic vagueness"
that may not help those working toward a legal solution to biopiracy).
67. See CBD, supra note 32, at art. I (promoting bioprospecting through "fair and
equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic re-
sources .... "); see, e.g., ONG, supra note 26, at 7 (repeating that there is a
legitimate difference between "bioprospecting" and "biopiracy").
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and processes that have been used over centuries in non-industrialized cul-
tures."68 Hence, to understand the sophisticated and subtle nature of misap-
propriating genetic resources through the intellectual property law,
particularly the patent law, it is important to begin the discussion of biopiracy
from this legal definition.69
An important purpose of the patent system is to grant the inventor or its
assignee with exclusive rights for a limited period of time to stimulate tech-
nological innovations.70 To effectuate this purpose, the patent system sepa-
rates appropriable knowledge that can be patented from knowledge residing
in the public domain that cannot. 7' Genetic resources at issue in bioprospect-
ing, however, present unique challenges to the patent system because it is
unclear whether biotechnological subject matters are patentable.72 Fre-
quently, biotechnological inventions may represent nothing more than a dis-
covery of substance found in nature. 73 Moreover, the alleged inventors may
obtain patent rights over the biotechnological subject matters merely through
isolation, purification, synthesization, adaptation, or application.74 In the bi-
oprospecting context, bioprospectors claim that such processes are inventive
steps that justify the removal of the genetic resources from the public do-
68. SHIVA, supra note 5, at 50 (emphasis added).
69. See Dutfield, supra note 62, at 92 (noting, however, that how one defines "bi-
opiracy" is important to devise a way to resolve biopiracy).
70. George Wei, Fitting Biological Products within the Intellectual Property
Framework: Challenges Facing the Policy Makers, in INTELL. PROP. AND Bio-
LOGICAL RESOURCES 28, 31 (Burton Ong ed., 2004) (explaining that the patent
owner simply has the right to exclude rather than a positive right to exploit the
invention). But cf. Shiva, supra note 5, at 21-33 (arguing that the rationales
for upholding domestic patent regimes, namely, promoting creativity, inven-
tiveness, knowledge generation, investments, research, and technology trans-
fers, are "myths" in the international context).
71. Hanns Ullrich, Traditional Knowledge, Biodiversity, Benefit-Sharing and the
Patent System: Romantics v. Economics? 3, 506 (EUI Working Paper LAW
No. 2005/07, 2005), available at http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/1814/
3327/1/lawO5-07.pdf at; see also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, art. 27.1, Dec.
15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS], available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/trips-e/tagmOe.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
72. See, e.g., OLIVER MILLS, BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS: MORAL RESTRAINTS
AND PATENT LAW 13-17 (Ashgate, 2005) (outlining the objections to patenting
biological subject matters such as characterizing biotechnology as an attempt at
"playing God").
73. See Wei, supra note 70, at 31 (opining that the objections to patentability are
stronger the closer the invention is to the natural product).
74. See Ullrich, supra note 71, at 9 (asserting that it is these incremental improve-
ments that are claimed as patentable invention).
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main.75 This debate on patentability of biotechnological subject matters im-
plicates complex issues that are beyond the scope of this paper.76 Regardless
of whether biotechnological subject matters should or should not be patenta-
ble, the current patent system not only permits, but also promotes patents on
inventions derived from genetic resources. 77 This western intellectual prop-
erty regime is central to biopiracy.
The western intellectual property regime has recognized traditional
knowledge (TK) as "in the 'public domain,' and thus, freely available for use
by anybody."78 However, the difficulties facing TK holders suggest that
traditional knowledge, or genetic resources (GR), are not freely available.
Biodiversity and genetic resources have long been considered a "heritage of
mankind" and at the local level, the "cultural and economic heritage" of the
indigenous communities who have maintained them for centuries.79 While
these indigenous communities, as GR-holders, request the creation of collec-
tive intellectual property rights, the present international legal framework is
not designed to operationalize such rights because they are "collective (not
individual or exclusive) and traditional knowledge (not new, but
ancestral)."80
75. Id. at 19.
76. See generally Mills, supra note 72, at 7-17 (discussing that patenting bi-
otechnological subject matter implicates political, religious, cultural, moral,
and economical issues).
77. See Wei, supra note 70, at 35-41 (listing various international and regional
agreements that permit patentability of plant and animal subject matters); see,
e.g., TRIPS, supra note 71, at art. 27.1 ("[P]atents shall be available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology."); but see
id. at art. 27.3(b) (permitting signatories from excluding biological process
from patentability).
78. See Carlos M. Correa, Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property: Issues
and Options Surrounding the Protection of Traditional Knowledge 3, QUAKER
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE (Nov. 2001), available at http://www.quno.org/ge-
neva/pdf/economic/Discussion/Traditional-Knowledge-IP-English.pdf (provid-
ing an overview of traditional knowledge and proposed biopiracy solutions and
the international forums for redress).
79. GRAIN-2, supra note 39.
80. See, e.g., Marcelo Dias Varella, Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Shar-
ing: Main Aspect of Some Legal Frameworks: Main Aspects of Some Legal
Frameworks, OPEN MEETING OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE RE-
SEARCH COMMUNITY, at 1 (Oct. 2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=
674502 (noting that such rights would require identification of a specific legal
entity and cannot be given to a vaguely defined community or multigenera-
tional entities). But see generally CHARLES R. MCMANIS, Fitting Traditional
Knowledge Protection and Biopiracy Claims into the Existing Intellectual
Property and Unfair Competition Framework, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 425, 425-30 (Burton Ong ed., 2004); Daniel Ger-
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This clash of incompatible intellectual property concepts and resource
rights (or lack thereof) encapsulates biopiracy. Bioprospectors own unequal
shares of patents obtained from the GRITK and receive unequal benefits.
The rhetoric used to describe biopiracy as the "looting and plundering"81 of
indigenous communities of developing countries is a consequence of an in-
compatible intellectual property regime that allows bioprospectors to monop-
olize genetic resources without providing indigenous communities a
mechanism to control or receive compensation.82 Although the fact that the
customary legal systems of the indigenous communities are incompatible
with the western intellectual property regime does not make them less valid,
incompatibility "does, however, make compliance difficult."83 The indige-
nous communities are entitled to the recognition of their intellectual property
and to the right to control, develop, and protect their genetic resources. Ad-
dressing the injustice and unfairness of biopiracy lies in properly recognizing
the rights of indigenous communities, or the GR-holders.84
C. Broader Implications of Biopiracy: The Tension between the
Industrialized North and the Farming South
At first glance, it may seem that the scope of biopiracy is well-defined
and limited to the realm of intellectual property law.85 However, biopiracy
also implicates broad and complex international issues that affect the polari-
zation between the developed "North" and the developing "South."86 On
Earth, the majority of plant diversity is concentrated in the Southern Hemi-
sphere.87 This skewed biological diversity has been a significant contributing
factor to the inequitable global economic regime that exists today.88 During
the colonial era, the colonial powers of the northern hemisphere organized
vais, Traditional Knowledge & Intellectual Property: A TRIPS-Compatible Ap-
proach, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 137, 149-160 (2005).
81. ONG, supra note 26, at 7.
82. See, e.g., Longacre, supra note 3, at 970-72 (listing various examples of recent
biopiracy, such as tamate, lycopene, and ayahuasca).
83. See Eiland, supra note 35, at 47.
84. See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limi-
tation on Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 735-36 (2003)
(discussing the benefits to be reaped from removing the geographic limitation
in Section 102 of the Patent Act).
85. See, e.g., Arezzo, supra note 31, at 375-76
86. See Eiland, supra note 35, at 47-48 (highlighting the general argument that
wealthy nations in the North improperly rely upon colonial era conceptions of
property to gain access to the resources in the South).
87. MGBEOJI, supra note 62, at 68.
88. See, e.g., id. (noting that the cumulative foreign debt of the South to the North
was estimated at $1.34 trillion and increasing in 1990).
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their colonies in the South as suppliers of cheap raw plant materials.89 This
basic paradigm continues in the contemporary global trading system today,
whereby the South has been organized to "feed the industrial machineries
and factories of the North."90 In order to continue to supply the North with
the "inescapable low price of commodities,"91 the South destroys its environ-
ment to meet Northern demands for raw materials and borrows funds exten-
sively from the North to purchase the finished goods.92 Scholars characterize
this modern relationship between the industrialized North and the farming
South as a "neo-feudalism."93
Biopiracy exacerbates this exploitive North-South relationship. The
North employs an intellectual property regime that legitimizes the exclusive
ownership of the genetic resources located in the South.94 By controlling the
rights to these resources, the economically wealthy North reaps a dispropor-
tionate share of the benefits derived from commercializing the genetic re-
sources. Most of the users of the genetic resource-derived products, which
include the consumers, scientific researchers, and private entities, reside in
the North.95 Hence, biopiracy continues the promotion of the northern indus-
tries by creating ever-expanding markets for patented genetic resources
originating from the South.96 Moreover, unregulated and unmonitored bi-
oprospecting causes environmental risks and damages the economies of the
South by depriving them of the opportunity to retain and exploit their own
natural resources. 97 In the modem global economy, where intellectual capital
is a more significant source of wealth creation than physical capital, the in-
89. See id. (explaining that these colonies, located in Africa, Asia, and Latin




92. Id. at 68.
93. MGBEOJI, supra note 62, at 69.
94. See SHIVA, supra note 5, at 49 (asserting that biopiracy occurs specifically
because the western intellectual property regime, designed for import monopo-
lies, is inadequate to address the unique characteristics of the bioprospecting
paradigm).
95. See ONG, supra note 26, at 10-11 (opining that the South serves as providers of
in situ biological/genetic resources to the North).
96. See MGBEOJI, supra note 62, at 35 (arguing that at the heart of the biopiracy
controversy is the motive to gain economic profits from patented products).
97. See Arezzo, supra note 31, at 373 (noting that developing countries lose their
rights to profit from trading and exporting their genetic resources abroad).
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ability of the South to capitalize on their genetic resources essentially dooms
them to perpetual poverty and a crushing debt burden to the North.98
The scope of issues involved in biopiracy is not limited to the intellec-
tual property regime and the North-South relationship. For instance, exten-
sive bioprospecting may reduce the Earth's biodiversity, and thus, biopiracy
implicates conservation. A majority of global biodiversity is located in the
South.99 Through bioprospecting, only those plants serving the interests of
man may flourish, and consequently, leave the Earth with reduced biodivers-
ity at unacceptable levels to posterity.OO
Under principles of fairness and distributive justice, biopiracy is a cir-
cumvention of the developed and affluent North's moral responsibility to
bridge the gap with the developing and poor South.1oI Understandably, bi-
opiracy is a deeply political and economic issue.102 While the core debates
on biopiracy are about the indigenous communities' rights, control, and com-
pensation, it is imperative to recognize how biopiracy implicates other broad
and important international debates.103
98. See MGBEOJI, supra note 62, at 35 (characterizing the intellectual property sys-
tem as merely a contemporary struggle between nations over economic and
technological interests); see also id. at 68 (noting some experts estimate an
annual net cash flow of $50 thousand million flowing from the poorest nations
to the richest nations).
99. Id. at 35; see also Kremers, supra note 5, at 17 (providing examples of bi-
opiracy affecting the Saami people located in Scandinavian countries of Fin-
land and Norway).
100. But see Mills, supra note 72, at 15 (offering a different school of thought which
opines that biodiversity can be enriched by adding engineered plant varieties).
101. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IN-
STITUTIONS 413-16 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (1995).
102. See, e.g., Kremers, supra note 5, at 24-25 (noting that legal protection of the
genetic resources and the associated traditional knowledge involves many com-
plex factors, such as the large diversity of the stakeholders each possessing
distinct political and economic goals).
103. See Arezzo, supra note 31, at 374 (arguing that, for example, even if there were
research cooperation among the developed and developing countries, the terms
of such agreements will be biased and the developing countries would be ex-
cluded from subsequent research, losing an invaluable opportunity to further
their own development).
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II. THE ARSENAL: EXISTING LEGAL MECHANISMS
TO COMBAT BIoPIRAcY
Remember the two benefits of failure. First, if you do fail, you learn
what doesn't work; and second, the failure gives you the opportunity to try a
new approach.
-Roger Von Oech 04
In 1998, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) con-
ducted a series of fact-finding missions in order to oppose biopiracy and
understand the needs and expectations of the indigenous TK/GR holding
communities.05 Professor Carlos Correa broadly classified the WIPO find-
ings of these opponents to biopiracy as equity, conservation, and
preservation: 106
TABLE 1: Classifying the Concerns of the Indigenous Communities.
Concerns of the Indigenous Communities
Equity Genetic resources and the associate traditional knowledge generates value
that requires fair recognition and compensation to its custodians.
Conservation Genetic resources and the associate traditional knowledge should be
protected to ensure conservation of the biodiversity and the environment.
Preservation Genetic resources and the associate traditional knowledge should be
protected to encourage and maintain the traditional practices and culture.
Today, bioprospecting has become a legitimate, routine, and aggres-
sively pursued industrial practice.107 And the western intellectual property
regime is an established part of the modem international legal landscape.08
In addition, there is a strong global policy for increasing access to the genetic
resources in order to promote scientific innovation and economic develop-
104. Author and speaker on fostering creativity and creative thinking. He is the
president of Creative Think, a California-based consulting firm.
105. See generally BOOKLET No. 2, supra note 10, at 3-10.
106. See Correa, supra note 78, at 5-7.
107. See, e.g, id. at 3 (noting that on a global scale, the market size for traditional
medicine developed from genetic resources is over $43 billion).
108. See generally Arrezo, supra note 31, at 376-78 (tracing the efforts of develop-
ing countries to address biopiracy through existing normative international
frameworks); see also TRIPS, supra note 71, at art. 27 ("[P]atents shall be
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capa-
ble of industrial application . . . patents shall be available and patent rights
enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of tech-
nology and whether products are imported or locally produced") (emphasis
added).
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ment. 09 In this context, opponents of biopiracy have proposed numerous
solutions to avert misappropriation of the genetic resources.
However, while various opponents of biopiracy may be in agreement on
the core concerns of biopiracy, a closer look reveals that many of their spe-
cific objectives are contradictory to each other, making it clear that no single
solution will resolve all of their distinct concerns. 10 Some of the proposed
solutions may be defined as "defensive protection" mechanisms that seek to
prevent wrongful patents for the genetic resources.]" The "positive protec-
tion" mechanisms empower the GR-holders to take affirmative steps to pro-
tect and to seek remedies against the bioprospectors who misappropriated
their genetic resources."12
In observing the various legal mechanisms available to address bi-
opiracy, Professor Dutfield opines that how one "defines biopiracy goes a
long way towards determining what [one] should do about it."'13 For in-
stance, if the problem of biopiracy is that the patent system legitimizes mis-
appropriation of the GR/TK, then defensive protection mechanisms will be
useful. 14 If the problem is inequitable benefit-sharing, then certain positive
protection mechanisms might be the desired remedy.115 Thus, in order to
understand biopiracy, it is necessary to explore the important role that intel-
lectual property law plays in facilitating the misappropriation of genetic re-
sources. However, intellectual property law need not play a prominent role
109. Longacre, supra note 3, at 965 (emphasizing the importance of striking a bal-
ance between GR-holders' rights and encouraging scientific innovation); see
also CBD, supra note 32, at art. 8(j) (requiring contracting countries to pro-
mote "wider application" of "indigenous communities" traditional knowledge,
innovation, and practices and encourage equitable sharing of benefits arising
out of their utilization.).
110. BOOKLET No. 2, supra note 10, at 16 (observing that "no single template or
comprehensive 'one-size-fits-all' solution is likely to suit all of the national
priorities and legal environment, let alone the needs of traditional communities
in all countries."); Kremers, supra note 5, at 24 (insisting that a "one-size-fits-
all" solution may not be desirable due to the complexities of issues involved in
biopiracy); see also Kohls, supra note 2, at 110-14 (classifying various defini-
tions, and at times, conflicting objectives of biopiracy).
111. BOOKLET No. 2, supra note 10, at 12.
112. Id. at 17 (explaining that a "positive protection" mechanism has strengths be-
cause it provides a forum of protection, an ability to choose specific policies,
and a capacity to carry out those policies).
113. Dutfield, supra note 62, at 4.
114. Id.; see discussion infra Parts II(A-B) (explaining the "defensive protection"
mechanisms of disclosure of origins requirement, prior informed consent, and
the worldwide digital database of traditional knowledge).
115. Dutfield, supra note 62, at 4; see also discussion infra Parts H.C, II.E (discuss-
ing the "positive protection" mechanisms of private agreements and sui generis
regimes).
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towards resolving biopiracy. The following are some of the most prominent
and growing forms of defensive and positive protection mechanisms that
comprise the present "arsenal" against biopiracy.
A. Worldwide Digital Databases of Traditional Knowledge
To be granted a valid patent, the patent applicant must demonstrate that
the claimed invention is novel and has an inventive step."l 6 As a defensive
protection mechanism, the worldwide digital databases of traditional knowl-
edge prevent the misappropriation of genetic resources by defeating the al-
leged novelty and inventiveness claims in a patent application."17 These
databases, such as the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) pro-
ject and the Traditional Knowledge Resource Classification (TKRC), recog-
nize the existence of certain traditional knowledge as "prior art" and are,
therefore, considered knowledge already in the public domain.'18 If a patent
application concerns the GR/TK recorded in the databases, the patent exam-
iner will deny the application.,19 This allows the worldwide digital databases
to confer a degree of legitimacy to the often undocumented and unwritten
traditional knowledge that may lead bioprospectors to a valuable genetic re-
source, while also facilitating the retrieval of prior art information so that
patent examiners can challenge the bioprospectors' assertion of novelty and
inventiveness in their patent applications for the GR/TK-derived
inventions. 120
116. JOHN BARTON, ET. AL., INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 82 (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Sept.
2002), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final-report/
CIPRfullfinal.pdf.
117. See id. at 82. (noting that patents for information in the public domain is funda-
mentally contradictory to the rationale of the patent system). But see Eiland,
supra note 35, at 65-66 (observing that an easily accessible worldwide digital
databases of traditional knowledge may actually increase the misappropriation
of genetic resources by providing a ready, searchable databases to potential
bioprospectors).
118. See generally BARTON, supra note 116, at 74.
119. See Eiland, supra note 35, at 64-65 (providing that the worldwide digital
databases would allow patent examiners to determine the novelty of the
claimed invention).
120. See BARTON, supra note 116, at 82 (opining that a robust documentation of
traditional knowledge may also contribute towards its preservation and promo-
tion). But see Eiland, supra note 35, at 65 (voicing concerns that before the
worldwide digital database can become truly useful, there must be substantial
amount of traditional knowledge recorded within the database first); see also
id. at 66 (implying that the patent examiners who are trained in the hard sci-
ences may find it difficult to accurately identify traditional knowledge within
the worldwide digital databases).
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The worldwide digital databases are important mechanisms toward ad-
dressing biopiracy, but there are significant obstacles to overcome before the
databases can truly become effective. To have a meaningful effect on deter-
ring illegal patents, the indigenous communities who possess the GR/TK
must play a crucial role in expanding the databases by actively contributing
their traditional knowledge.' 2' However, much traditional knowledge will
continue to remain undocumented, and some indigenous communities may
even withhold or falsify their knowledge because they believe that the tradi-
tional knowledge is sacred and should be kept secret. 22 In addition, the
worldwide digital databases are long-term projects that require extensive fi-
nancial and administrative support from NGOs and governments. 23 In fact,
both the TKDL and TKRC are supported by their governments for compiling
the traditional knowledge for the benefit of the indigenous communities
within their respective countries.124 Hence, the worldwide digital databases
are exceptional projects that leave many other indigenous communities
around the world without an analogous worldwide digital database to protect
their own GR/TK.125 Finally, due to the long-term nature of these projects,
the worldwide digital databases are ineffective at preventing misappropria-
tion of genetic resources that is currently occurring.126 Therefore, the world-
wide digital databases' effectiveness on addressing biopiracy remains to be
seen.
B. Disclosure of Origins and Prior Informed Consent
Some scholars suggest that the mandatory disclosure of origins require-
ment and prior informed consent should become additional conditions for
121. See Eiland, supra note 35, at 66 (saying that it is the indigenous communities
who have relevant access to the genetic resources and traditional knowledge,
and they must voluntarily divulge such information in order to successfully
document it).
122. See, e.g., id. at 80 (implying that some indigenous communities will not be
cooperative and noting specifically Peru's indigenous communities who re-
fused to disclose their traditional knowledge as an example).
123. See id. (highlighting that, for example, the WIPO Task Force includes repre-
sentatives of only the politically and economically strong stakeholders, such as
China, India, US, and EC).
124. See BOOKLET No. 2, supra note 10, at 29 (explaining that the TKDL and
TKRC are both supported and developed by the Indian government).
125. See Kohls, supra note 2, at 121 (stating that, as an example, the Society for
Research and Initiatives for Sustainable Technologies and Institutions in India
developed their databases in order to register only local knowledge and na-
tional medicinal plants).
126. See BOOKLET No. 2, supra note 10, at 29 (stating that the TKDL took nearly
two years to compile a database on all uses of Ayureveda, a system of tradi-
tional Indian medicine).
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patentability.127 The disclosure of origins requirement would compel bi-
oprospectors to include information about the origin of the genetic resource
and the source of the traditional knowledge in their patent applications. 128
Meanwhile, prior informed consent would require bioprospectors to show
proof of obtaining prior informed consent from the GR-holders before being
granted a patent. 29 Like the worldwide digital databases, the disclosure of
origins requirement and prior informed consent function as defensive protec-
tion mechanisms to prevent wrongful patents. In addition to denying patent
applications that do not disclose the origin of the underlying GR/TK or prov-
ing prior informed consent from the GR-holders, these defensive protection
mechanisms serve to improve the substantive examination of patent applica-
tions, prevent enforceability of bad patents, and increase transparency of na-
tional and international systems of intellectual property law. 130
Although some national legislations have incorporated requirements for
disclosure of origins and prior informed consent, an international system
mandating these two additional conditions for patentability does not currently
exist.'3' Such an international system is strongly advocated by numerous
scholars, such as Professors Joshua Sarnoff and Nuno Pires de Carvalho,
127. See Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Biodiversity, Biotechnology, and the Legal Pro-
tection of Traditional Knowledge: From the Shaman's Hut to the Patent Office:
In Search of a TRIPS-Consistent Requirement to Disclose the Origin of Genetic
Resources and Prior Informed Consent, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y I11,
124-36 (2005) (arguing that the disclosure of origins requirement is not only
incompatible with TRIPS, but other frameworks, such as the Union for the
Protection of New Varieties of Plants Convention, the Patent Cooperation
Treaty, and the Patent Law Treaty).
128. See Kremers, supra note 5, at 39 (explaining how a disclosure of origins re-
quirement can act as a defensive mechanism to prevent bioprospectors from
illegally obtaining or exercising legal rights over the genetic resources).
129. See, e.g., Longacre, supra note 3, at 999 (noting that the genetic resources-
source country, local authorities, or indigenous communities can give prior in-
formed consent); see also Nuno Pires de Carvalho, International and Compar-
ative Law Issues: Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources and
Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications Without Infringing the TRIPS:
The Problem and the Solution, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 371, 374 (2000).
130. See U.N. Comm. on Trade & Dev., The Conference of the Parties, Jan.
30-Feb. 3, 2006, Analysis of Options for Implementing Disclosure of Origin
Obligations in Intellectual Property Applications, 3-5, UNCTAD/DTIC/TED/
2005/14 (Dec. 22, 2005) (prepared by Joshua Sarnoff & Carlos Correa) [here-
inafter Sarnoff] (outlining the benefits of including a mandatory disclosure of
origins requirement as a condition of patentability); see also Kremers, supra
note 5, at 39-40 (opining that courts can easily refuse to enforce the patent
when the patent applicant fails to make the requisite showing of compliance
with disclosure of origins requirement).
131. See Sarnoff, supra note 130, at 24 n. 41 (citing, for example, that Peru has a
national legislation imposing the disclosure of origins requirement as a condi-
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both of whom see the disclosure of origins requirement as one way of harmo-
nizing the two most prominent international legal frameworks affecting ge-
netic resources: the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).132 Specifically,
under TRIPS Article 27.1, misappropriation of genetic resources is possible
because patents are granted for any invention "provided that they are new,
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application."133 In
contrast, CBD Article 15.5 provides that access to the genetic resources
should be based on prior informed consent.134 Since prior informed consent
would allow the GR-holders to challenge a patent even though it conforms
with TRIPS Article 27.1, the CBD and TRIPS are often seen as
contradictory. 135
To harmonize these two important international frameworks, Professor
Sarnoff proposes an amendment that adds the disclosure of origins require-
ment to TRIPS.136 This amendment would effectively transplant prior in-
formed consent into TRIPS Article 27.1 as one of the requirements for
patentability because a disclosure of origins requirement will "improve deter-
mination of inventorship ... thereby assisting in the identification of [GR-
holders] involved" from whom the patent applicants must obtain prior in-
formed consent to use the GR/TK.137 However, as Professor Carvalho ar-
tion of patentability for those patents developed using genetic resources and
traditional knowledge with Peruvian origin).
132. See id. at 75-80 (advocating for an amendment to TRIPS that implements the
disclosure of origins requirement based on equitable and moral principles); see,
e.g., Carvalho, supra note 127, at 145-48 (arguing that the disclosure of origins
requirement and prior informed consent should also be used as a condition for
enforcing patent rights).
133. TRIPS, supra note 71, at art. 27.1 (emphasis added); see Eiland, supra note 35,
at 67-68 (implying that TRIPS article 27.1 makes no mention of requiring the
disclosure of the origins of either the genetic resources or associated traditional
knowledge).
134. CBD, supra note 32, at art. 15.5 ("[A]ccess to genetic resources shall be sub-
ject to prior informed consent of the Contracting Party...").
135. See, e.g., Kohls, supra note 2, at 132-33 (noting that a disclosure of origins
requirement under TRIPS would allow GR-holders to block patents on genetic
resources before they are granted). But see Sarnoff, supra note 130, at 3-4
(suggesting instead that TRIPS simply does not require any measures to effec-
tuate the CBD obligations, and thus, these two international legal frameworks
are not contradictory).
136. See Sarnoff, supra note 130, at 1-2 (arguing that a disclosure of origins re-
quirement allows the patent system to deter misappropriation and take respon-
sibility to address unjust conducts).
137. See id. at 7-8 (opining that the disclosure of origins requirement will increase
transparencies of legal principles, such as the prior informed consent, and
thereby reduce uncertainties of legal and equitable principles); see also id. at 9
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gues, any amendment to TRIPS is unlikely due to strong oppositions from
major and influential developed countries, such as the United States and Ja-
pan. 38 Although the disclosure of origins requirement and prior informed
consent can be powerful mechanisms to resolve biopiracy, it is unlikely to be
implemented in the near future.139
C. Sui generis System of Intellectual Property Rights
Recognizing the unique characteristics of the GR/TK, many scholars
and commentators propose sui generis rights in order to create a distinct legal
system "of its own kind" that can more appropriately address the GR/TK and
its unique policy needs1 40 For instance, a sui generis system might give the
GR-holders property-like rights over their genetic resources.' 4' As a positive
protection mechanism, sui generis rights may also include rights to control
access to the genetic resources, to participate at all levels of the decision-
making process, to enforce indigenous customary laws, and to mandate equi-
table benefit sharing.142 Instead of forcing the GR/TK into existing legal
frameworks, a sui generis system would create separate legal regimes that
seek to recognize, protect, and promote the rights of the GR-holders while
simultaneously encouraging access to the genetic resources. 43
Although many countries have separately enacted their own sui generis
systems, there has been little progress in developing a uniform, international
(noting further that the disclosure of origins requirement can be used to comply
with prior informed consent for access and equitable benefit-sharing require-
ments where they exist).
138. See, e.g., Longacre, supra note 3, at 999-1003 (illustrating additional problems
of disclosure of origins requirement and prior informed consent, such as from
whom the prior informed consent should most appropriately be obtained).
139. See also Kohis, supra note 2, at 133-35 (insisting that an amendment to TRIPS
restricts the flexibilities of member states to experiment with various protection
mechanisms).
140. See BOOKLET No. 2, supra note 10, at 20-21 (illustrating prominent sui generis
regimes, such as the Biodiversity Law No. 7788 of Costa Rica, that regulate
access to the genetic resources and provide equitable benefit sharing to the GR-
holders).
141. See Correa, supra note 78, at 14 (stating that the Third World Network devel-
oped such a sui generis system in 1994, the Community Intellectual Rights
Act).
142. See BARTON, supra note 116, at 79 (noting that a sui generis system enacted in
the Philippines granted its GR-holders such rights).
143. See id. at 80 (detailing the national legislations from the Philippines, Guate-
mala, and Bangladesh that attempt to achieve a balance between the need to
protect the genetic resources and to increase access to them).
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sui generis system.144 Professor Correa opines that such an international sys-
tem has numerous complex, conceptual, and practical problems, such as de-
fining the subject matter of protection, the requirements and duration of such
protection, the conferred rights, and the enforcement mechanisms.145 These
problems may limit the effectiveness of a sui generis system to address bi-
opiracy outside of specific national boundaries.146 Moreover, some scholars
question whether a single, international, and comprehensive sui generis sys-
tem should be adopted at all.147 Professor John Barton adds that a single, all-
encompassing sui generis system "may be too specific and not flexible
enough" to accommodate the various concerns of the opponents of bi-
opiracy.48 Unless the various obstacles and the academic disagreement over
the proper scope (national or international sui generis system) are resolved,
the numerous national sui generis systems that currently exist may just form
an incoherent and ineffective patchwork of legal mechanisms that ultimately
fail to defend against biopiracy.149
144. See, e.g., id. (implying that it is unlikely that various national systems can find
sufficiently common characteristics to form a workable international sui
generis system). See generally WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell.
Prop. & Genetic Resources, Jul. 7-15, 2003, Comparative Summary of Sui
Generis Legislation for the Protection of Traditional Cultural Expression,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/3 (Apr. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Summary], available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/laws/pdf/grtkf ic_5_inf 4 annex.
pdf (summarizing the various national sui generis regimes enacted around the
world).
145. See Correa, supra note 78, at 14 (observing that the issues surrounding sui
generis system have stalled the progress of implementing an international sui
generis regime); see also Charles R. McManis, Fitting Traditional Knowledge
Protection and Biopiracy Claims into the Existing Intellectual Property and
Unfair Competition Framework, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BIOLOGICAL
REsOURCEs 425, 474 (Burton Ong ed., 2004) (arguing that an attempt to create
a consistent international sui generis regime will unleash the "politics of intel-
lectual property law").
146. See Correa, supra note 78, at 14 (stating that an international sui generis sys-
tem must address not only the genetic resources and the associated traditional
knowledge but also artistic creations and folklore, which adds further
complexities).
147. See id. (explaining that resolving whether a single or multiple sui generis re-
gimes will most effectively address biopiracy is a critical policy issue).
148. See BARTON, supra note 116, at 80 (noting that a single sui generis regime may
not accommodate those opponents of biopiracy, such as the Kechuan Indian in
Peru, who operate under a different concept of wealth that is contradictory to
the western concept).
149. See, e.g., BOOKLET No. 2, supra note 37, at 20-22 (giving examples of national
legislations of sui generis systems); McManis, supra note 145, at 475-76 (ex-
plaining that ad hoc systems lead to over- and under-protection that ultimately
fail to serve the public interest); but see, e.g., BARTON, supra note 116, at 80
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D. Private Agreements
A private agreement is a contractual relationship between the biopros-
pectors and the GR-holders, and is an example of a positive protection mech-
anism.150 Private agreements enable the bioprospectors to own,15' use, and
license the genetic resources.152 In her comment, Maggie Kohls strongly ad-
vocates the increased use of private agreements in the bioprospecting con-
text. 53 She asserts that through private agreements, the bioprospectors
would acknowledge the source of the GR/TK, and by design, negotiate to
compensate the GR-holders for their genetic resources and traditional knowl-
edge.14 In addition, because bioprospectors have an enormous financial
stake in successfully reaching an agreement, they will be compelled to en-
gage in creative and individualized solutions that invite continued coopera-
tion from GR-holders.155 This room for creativity within the private
agreement framework is possible because TRIPS only sets a minimum re-
quirement for patentability that encourages flexibility and private experimen-
tation at the national and local levels.156 Moreover, because bioprospectors
must acknowledge the source of the GR/TK due to their need to negotiate a
contract with the relevant GR-holders, the private agreement framework may
(highlighting various efforts, such as by the GI5 Group of developing coun-
tries, seeking to establish an international sui generis system).
150. See Kohls, supra note 2, at 128-29 (illustrating examples of private agree-
ments, such as the Natura Cosmetics SA private agreement with the indigenous
communities of Brazil).
151. See id. at 122-23 (elaborating that a "joint ownership" of the genetic resource
in a private agreement framework recognizes the specific contributions of the
GR-holders as suppliers of the genetic resource, and in some cases, the tradi-
tional knowledge).
152. See Kremers, supra note 5, at 38-39 (suggesting that private agreements can
eliminate some of the obstacles that made joint ownership infeasible, specifi-
cally the unrealistic premise that ownership rights can be allocated between
contracting parties).
153. See Kohls, supra note 2, at 135 (opining that in addition to addressing the core
issues of biopiracy, private agreements can also address the issues of preserva-
tion and conservation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge).
154. See id. (asserting that private companies are willing to accept source disclosure
and benefit sharing if those legal requirements are clear and stable).
155. See id. (suggesting that the bioprospectors are also motivated by the necessity
to ensure preservation and conservation of the biodiversity because it is the
source of the valuable genetic resources that bioprospectors need).
156. See id. at 134 (stating that TRIPS gives discretion to individual states to pursue
its national intellectual property legislation, serving as a "laboratories of
experimentation").
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have the added benefit of mandating prior informed consent and a disclosure
of origins requirement without any inconsistency with TRIPS.157
Despite the promising potential of private agreements to resolve bi-
opiracy, they nevertheless have weaknesses.158 Since the contracting parties
must reach an agreement before the true value of a genetic resource is real-
ized, some scholars fear that genetic resources will be incorrectly valued.159
Also, there are concerns that when bioprospectors form private agreements
with government entities of developing countries, the GR-holders may not
benefit from equitable benefit sharing because the compensation may pool
within the government without streaming down to the indigenous communi-
ties.160 Further, Professor Nancy Kremers postulates that a private agreement
for genetic resources may not form because it must accommodate complex
relationships among cultural, social, legal, and environmental factors that are
absent in a normal business agreement.' 6' There may also be a potential
problem of negotiating with non-representative parties who claim to be rep-
resenting the GR-holders.162 Moreover, ensuring that the GR-holders receive
adequate legal representations is a critical concern towards the feasibility of
forming private agreements. 63 Finally, private agreements are difficult to
enforce in a transnational setting.
Nevertheless, private agreements should become an important mecha-
nism to address biopiracy because they can responsively and immediately
address issues of control and equitable benefit sharing. Although biopros-
157. See Eiland, supra note 35, at 69 (implying that because the bioprospectors can
only have access to the genetic resources pursuant to private agreements, they
must disclose the source of the genetic resources, and if applicable, the tradi-
tional knowledge).
158. See Kremers, supra note 5, at 34-35 (explaining that the uncertainty inherent in
any transnational contracting is also present in a bioprospecting private
agreement).
159. See Carvalho, supra note 127, at 153-56 (noting that there might not be a duty
on the bioprospectors to reveal the potential value of the genetic resource to the
GR-holders).
160. See Eiland, supra note 35, at 70 (criticizing the assumption that the benefits
will "trickle down" to indigenous communities from governments that enter
into private agreements with the bioprospectors).
161. See Kremers, supra note 5, at 35 (noting that a bioprospecting private agree-
ment may be prohibitively more complicated than traditional foreign invest-
ment experiences in petroleum or timber industries).
162. See BARTON, supra note 116, at 77 (reporting that a private agreement between
a British pharmaceutical company and a government entity of South Africa for
hoodia cactus resulted in claims of biopiracy because the government entity
was not representative of the GR-holders, the San People).
163. See, e.g., id. at 37 (implying that legal representation is required to give indige-
nous communities business advice in addition to legal advice).
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pecting for genetic resources has become an established practice, many bi-
oprospectors are now moving away from the traditional bioprospecting of
raw materials to marine exploration.164 Any further delays in resolving bi-
opiracy within the GR/TK context may render both the positive and defen-
sive protection mechanisms obsolete.165 In order to prevent biopiracy in a
meaningful and timely manner, private agreements should become a promi-
nent weapon for the GR-holders to combat biopiracy.
III. EXPANDING THE ARSENAL AGAINST BIOPIRAcy:
THE CONCESSION AGREEMENT FRAMEWORK
What is new is the emerging belief that together, the custodians of bio-
logical diversity in the Third World and those who want to make money out
of it in the North can do it in collusion now, through equitable and just
partnerships.
-GRAIN166
One potential method to address the injustice and unfairness of bi-
opiracy may be found by creating a legal regime that provides GR-holders
with mandatory control and permissive equitable benefit-sharing while si-
multaneously ensuring that bioprospectors have access to genetic re-
sources. 167 While intellectual property law may achieve these goals,168 it is
through the flexible and practical framework of private agreements that most
effectively and responsively provide GR-holders with mandatory control
over bioprospectors and their activities, while simultaneously developing an
equitable benefit-sharing regime.
A concession agreement is a private agreement with special characteris-
tics that make it particularly capable of meeting the objectives of mandatory
control and permissive equitable benefit sharing for GR-holders.169 Conces-
164. See Eiland, supra note 35, at 72 (stating that there has been a lack of recent
discoveries of commercially valuable products from traditional biological raw
materials).
165. See id. (noting that marine exploitation takes place within defined, nationally
controlled coastlines, which gives bioprospectors the legal certainty missing in
bioprospecting for genetic resource and the associated traditional knowledge).
166. GRAIN-2, supra note 39.
167. See, e.g., Longacre, supra note 3, at 994 (opining that the GR-source states
must find a balance between strict control or no control over their genetic
resources).
168. See Kohls, supra note 2 at 134 (saying that TRIPS is flexible and does not
preclude "mutually agreeable" solutions between bioprospectors and GR-
holders).
169. See DETLEV F. VAGTS ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 528 (4th
ed., Foundation Press 2003) (1986) (noting that in a concession agreement, also
known as a development agreement, the contracting parties do not have the
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sion agreements are often employed in public-sector projects, most famously
to facilitate prospecting and developing natural mineral or oil deposits.170 Bi-
oprospecting in many ways is analogous to these traditional prospecting ac-
tivities, as both involve considerable risks of failure and raise questions of
ownership and control over the resources that are extracted from the land.171
In 1981, the tribunal in the famous LIAMCO arbitration described the
unique characteristics of a concession agreement as a "semi-public agreement
made between a State and a private individual . . . whose object covers a
project of ... exploitation of natural resources, and in which are defined the
rights and obligations of the parties in their mutual relationship."72 In addi-
tion to these characteristics, a concession agreement is distinct from a normal
private agreement because it serves predominantly as a major instrument of
economic development for resource-rich states. 73 Hence, a concession
agreement can be viewed as a joint public venture whereby the foreign pri-
vate institution (FPI) and the host state cooperate in the development of a
desired natural resource for their mutual benefits.174
The fundamental characteristics of a concession agreement illustrate
how useful the concession agreement framework can be in the bioprospect-
presumed parity of bargaining powers); see generally Mohamed Ebrahim Al-
Naqbi, Oil Concession Agreement: An Exploration of the Effect of Asymmetric
Negotiations on Conflict Creation in Three Middle Eastern Countries between
the Years of 1900-1975 (Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia), AAT 3047492, GEORGE
MASON UNIVERSITY, 2002 (exploring the impact of the asymmetrical negotia-
tion strengths between the private oil companies and concession- granting na-
tions in the early concession agreements of the 20th Century).
170. JEFFREY DELMON, PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE: PROJECT
FINANCE, PPP PROJECTS AND RISK 251 (Wolters Kluwer 2d ed. 2009).
171. See ONG, supra note 26, at 7 (saying that the principle difference is that the
bioprospectors are seeking biological resources that can be developed for com-
mercial exploitation).
172. Libyan American Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 20 I.L.M. 1, 29-30 (1981)
(deciding a dispute that arose between LIAMCO, a foreign private institution,
and the Libyan Government over petroleum concession agreement) (emphasis
added).
173. See VAGTS ET AL., supra note 169, at 528 (explaining that concession agree-
ments are hardly distinguishable from a developing country's development
plan); see also Delmon, supra note 170, at 251 (opining that concession agree-
ments are the backbone of public-private partnership ventures).
174. See Samuel K. B. Asante, Stability of Contractual Relations in the Transna-
tional Investment Process, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 401, 401-403 (1979) (stat-
ing that the concession agreement lies more in the public law rather than in the
private contract domain); see also Delmon, supra note 170, at 251-53 (noting
further that concession agreements serve as a mechanism that allows the con-
cession granting states to allocate certain risks to the foreign private
institutions).
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ing context.175 Table 2 briefly summarizes the applicability of the concession
agreement framework to bioprospecting in detail, and it also highlights how
the concession agreement framework can satisfy some of the desired objec-
tives of GR-holders. 176
TABLE 2: Comparison of the Concession Agreement Framework in its
Traditional Context and Bioprospecting77
Traditional Prospecting Bioprospecting
Semi-public State & Private Entity State & Bioprospectors
Venture
Extraction of Petroleum Biological and biochemical
Natural Minerals resources
Resource Gas Traditional knowledge associated
to genetic resources
Long-Term Extraction Extraction
Relationship Exclusivity of access and use Exclusivity of access and use
Joint Public Venture (patent)
Cooperative infrastructure Joint Public Venture
construction and development Cooperative research and
Exclusive rights may last for development
decades Exclusive patent rights may last
for decades
Defined Rights Obligations/Duties: Desired Objectives:
and Obligations Conservation Conservation
Good faith Good faith
Ownership Ownership
Incidental use (land, water, etc.) Incidental use (associated TK)
Compensations Compensation
Royalties Royalties
Economic Financial assistance Desired Objectives:
Development Transfer of technology and Financial assistance
Strategy human resources Transfer of technology and
human resources
Flexibility to Renegotiation provision Desired Objectives:
Modify Option to renegotiate
Dispute Arbitration Desired Objective:
Resolution Forum of redress
175. See VAGTS ET AL., supra note 169, at 528-30 (outlining the elements of the
concession agreements and how the bargaining parity shifted to the resource-
rich states over the years); see, e.g., Al-Naqbi, supra note 169, at 374-80 (con-
cluding that the asymmetry in bargaining relationship vanished in recent con-
cession agreements, exploring the transformation of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
Iraq oil concession agreements as illustrating this current trend).
176. See generally, Correa, supra note 78, at 2-4 (describing the bioprospecting
paradigm and biopiracy as it relates to traditional knowledge).
177. See generally, James N. Hyde, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth
and Resources, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 854, 861-66 (1956) (explaining the impact
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A. Semi-Public Venture: Accommodating the Increased Role of
Governments in Preventing Biopiracy
In the modem bioprospecting paradigm, there is a definitive trend to-
wards forming bilateral agreements between northern-based entities and
southern-based government and government-related entities.178 A concession
agreement for bioprospecting could involve a genetic resources-source state
(GR-source state) and a FPI. Therefore, it could become a semi-public ven-
ture between a government and the bioprospectors. However, before a GR-
source state can enter into a contract with the bioprospectors, it must have
recognized property rights and authority within its jurisdiction to negotiate
for control and use of the genetic resources. 179 In concession agreements for
bioprospecting, this authority derives from the principle of permanent sover-
eignty over natural resources.180 Article 1 of the seminal Resolution No.
1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources mandates
that "the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their
natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their na-
tional development and of the well-being of the people of the State
concerned." 181
Resolution 1803 is unclear as to whether people or nations possess the
right of permanent sovereignty.182 However, in the bioprospecting context,
there is no such ambiguity. It is the GR-source states who possess the sover-
eign rights over the genetic resources, and the CBD acknowledges this per-
manent sovereignty over natural resources of nations in Article 15.1,
of permanent sovereignty on the authority of resource-rich states to exploit
their natural resources).
178. See Latin American Alliance, supra note 16 (noting some "high-profile" bi-
oprospecting bilateral agreements such as the Merck/INBio agreement); see
also Ragavan, supra note 1, at 518 (listing BIOAMAZONIA agreement in Bra-
zil and the Indian agreement for Jeevani as another example of government-
bioprospector bilateral agreements).
179. See, e.g., Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples' Ownership of
Natural Resources in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 33, 38
(2006) (tracing the origin of permanent sovereignty over natural resources to
the General Assembly Resolution 626 (VII) of December 21, 1952 entitled
Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources).
180. See Ragavan, supra note 1, at 862 (enunciating that the sovereign right cannot
stand alone but in relation to treaties, international agreements, and other forms
of estoppel).
181. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No.17, U.N. Doc. A/5217, at 15 (December 14, 1962) (emphasis
added).
182. See Duruigbo, supra note 179, at 43-49 (explaining that the right of permanent
sovereignty may vest exclusively in peoples, solely in states, or jointly in peo-
ple and the states).
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"recognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources, the
authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with the national gov-
ernments and is subject to national legislation."183 Therefore, under the
CBD, the state has a sovereign right over its genetic and other biological
resources. The permanent sovereignty gives the GR-source states-not the
indigenous communities-the authority to grant concessions to the FPI in a
bioprospecting concession agreement.
Even if the indigenous communities of the GR-source states are consid-
ered the actual GR-holders, who the bioprospectors must recognize, Article
15.1 of the CBD implicitly subjects these indigenous communities to the ju-
risdiction of their respective states because the states have the authority to
determine access to the genetic resources and to exploit the genetic resources
according to its national policies.184 Article 8(j) of the CBD makes this im-
plication explicit by declaring that the Contracting Parties are "subject to...
national legislation... for the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity and promote their wider application [and] utilization of such
knowledge."185
The Preamble of TRIPS mirrors the CBD's grant of authority to the
states over their genetic resources. Although TRIPS recognizes that intellec-
tual property rights are "private rights,"86 it immediately relates these private
rights to national policy by stating that TRIPS "recognize[s] the underlying
public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual
property, including developmental and technological objectives."187 To-
gether, the CBD and TRIPS grant permanent sovereignty to the GR-source
states and not to the indigenous communities. In fact, Professor Marcelo
Dias Varella opines that with the adoption of the CBD in 1992, the protection
of national interests took priority over local interests of the indigenous com-
munities.188 For instance, many Latin American countries have centralized
183. CBD, supra note 32, at art. 15(1) (outlining the requirements for the Con-
tracting Parties in order to gain legitimate access to the genetic resources under
the CBD) (emphasis added).
184. See id. (noting that any access to the genetic resources is subject to national
legislation); see also id. at PREAMBLE ("Reaffirming also that States are respon-
sible for conserving their biological diversity and for using [it] in a sustainable
manner.").
185. CBD, supra note 32, at art. 8(j) (referring to "Contracting Parties" generally to
include the GR-source state, GR-holders, and the foreign bioprospectors) (em-
phasis added).
186. TRIPS, supra note 71, at PREAMBLE ("Recognizing that intellectual property
rights are private rights.").
187. See id. (addressing the importance of adequate intellectual property rights in
international trade) (emphasis added).
188. Varella, supra note 80, at 7.
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the control of access to the genetic resources at the government level.18 9
While there is recognition that the indigenous communities have the right to
participate, the current trend is that they are not an independent group that
can exercise decision-making power above national interests. 90 In short,
GR-source states have the authority to become parties to a concession agree-
ment for bioprospecting with bioprospectors who seek to extract the genetic
resources.
Additionally, the GR-source states may gain the authority to engage in a
bioprospecting concession agreement independently of permanent sover-
eignty. If the rights to the genetic resources and the associated traditional
knowledge belong exclusively to the GR-holders, the GR-source states can
nevertheless enter into a bioprospecting concession agreement by becoming a
trustee of the GR/TK for the GR-holders.191 One example of a trustee system
in bioprospecting involves the San People of South Africa and the Hoodia
cactus. 92 The South African government established the Council for Scien-
tific and Industrial Research (CSIR) that assisted the San People in develop-
ing Hoodia and obtained a patent on the active ingredient.193 Subsequently,
CSIR sold the Hoodia patent to a British pharmaceutical.194 Unfortunately,
the San People were never aware of this deal and threatened legal actions
189. Compare id. (noting that the African countries have opted for an opposite ap-
proach of decentralizing the decision-making power and seeking to empower
the indigenous communities), with African Union, Framework on Bioprospect-
ing, AU/EXP/ST/13(III) 3-10 (Nov. 2007), available at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/AU/Conferences/2007/November/HRST/AMCOST/docs/pdf/
AU-EXP-ST-13_III -ENG-Framework%20on%20Bioprospecting.pdf (advo-
cating for a more centralized system to combat biopiracy in the African
countries).
190. See Varella, supra note 80, at 8 (noting, for instance, that while the Brazilian
Provisionary Measure 2.052/2000 respects the rights of indigenous communi-
ties to refuse access to their genetic resources and traditional knowledge, the
legislation authorizes the national commission to override when necessary for
the public interest). But see Summary, supra note 144, at 12 (identifying Costa
Rican law, the Biodiversity Law No. 7788, that recognizes the right of local
communities and indigenous peoples to oppose access to their genetic re-
sources and traditional knowledge).
191. See, e.g., Kohls, supra note 2, at 125-27 (noting examples of governments
acting as trustees for the GR-holders of genetic resources).
192. See id. (describing hoodia cactus as an appetite suppressant, thirst quencher,
and awareness heightener).
193. See BARTON, supra note 116, at 77 (explaining that the CSIR isolated hoodia's
appetite-suppressing element, P57, and obtained a patent on it in 1995).
194. See id. (noting that the British pharmaceutical was PhytoPharma, an herbal
manufacturer).
(Vol. XIV
Expanding the Arsenal Against Biopiracy
against CSIR for biopiracy.195 Although the Hoodia cactus scenario is an
example of the inappropriate use of the trustee model that perpetuated bi-
opiracy, it nevertheless demonstrates the feasibility of how governments can
represent the GR-holders in a semi-public, bioprospecting concession agree-
ment. 196 Therefore, even if there is no international framework that explicitly
recognizes permanent sovereignty over the genetic resources, a semi-public
agreement can form in the bioprospecting context when governments become
trustees and enter into a bioprospecting concession agreement on behalf of
the GR-holders.197
Framing bioprospecting concession agreement as a semi-public venture
raises an important concern as to whether the interests of the indigenous
communities, the actual GR-holders, are adequately represented by their gov-
ernments. Observing the historical trend in other public-private extractive
agreements certainly gives credence to this concern. Professor Emeka
Duruigbo identifies the "resource curse," which refers to a phenomenon of an
inverse relationship between a country's endowment with natural resources
and its economic growth.198 In the first concession agreement, the 1901
D'Arcy Concession, the notion of permanent sovereignty over natural re-
sources was hailed as a catalyst for economic development of the developing
countries.99 However, this historic idealism contrasts sharply with the mod-
ern reality where kleptocratic activities have impoverished the citizenry of
the resource-rich states and forestalled their economic development.20 If the
GR-holders employ the concession agreement framework to prevent bi-
opiracy, are they simply exchanging one group of actors that misappropriates
to another domestic group of governmental actors?
An example from Norway answers the above question in the negative.
Norway derived tremendous economic benefits from judicious uses of con-
195, See id. (insisting that the CSIR failed to attain prior informed consent as re-
quired by the CBD of all stakeholders before transferring the patent to
PhytoPharma).
196. See id. (explaining that the CSIR negotiated directly with foreign corporations,
such as Pfizer, who attempted to acquire rights to sell hoodia in the western
diet and obesity markets, which are worth more than $6 billion).
197. See Kohls, supra note 2, at 125 (qualifying the use of the trusteeship model on
the fact that there is a mutuality of interest between the trustee and the GR-
holders, which is not always true).
198. See Duruigbo, supra note 179, at 33-34 (emphasizing the "resource curse" as a
"leadership curse" because the root of the "curse" are kleptocratic rulers that
rob the benefits away from the country and its citizenry).
199. See id. at 34 (opining that this original optimism and the modern reality of the
resource-rich developing countries could not be much starker).
200. See id. (citing examples such as the former Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein who
took ownership of the Iraqi oil wealth as one of his kleptocratic activities).
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cession agreements. 20' In 1990, Norway established a Special Petroleum
Fund that funded numerous social programs for their aging population,
served as a buffer during economic recessions, and functioned to transfer its
current wealth to future generations.202 Although Norway clearly demon-
strates that the resource curse is not inevitable, Norway's case is distinguish-
able from the numerous countries that inappropriately used their concession
agreement benefits.203 For instance, prior to entering into its first concession
agreement, Norway already possessed strong democratic institutions, estab-
lished social forces and rule of law, and instituted a robust system of checks
on government corruption.2 04 However, despite these distinguishing factors,
Norway is a model for the GR-source states to follow regardless of whether
they have strong political institutions.205 In addition, the infamous resource
curse cases in Nigeria and Iraq are the exceptions, and they are not represen-
tative of the numerous GR-source states, such as Peru, Costa Rica, China,
and India, that seek to exploit their genetic resources fairly and justly for
public benefit.206 Hence, the GR-holders should not eliminate the concession
agreement framework as a mechanism to address biopiracy simply because
of the historical incidences of the resource curse. Although many GR-source
states may not possess robust democracies and less corruption-prone institu-
tions like Norway, there is little reason to doubt that the GR-source states
201. See id. at 83-86 (arguing that the keys to the effective use of concession agree-
ments are a strong institution and proper spending of revenues derived from the
natural resources).
202. See id. at 89 (explaining that although Norway was a net exporter of oil, it was
not at the level of other oil-exporting countries, such as Nigeria and Saudi
Arabia).
203. See Duruigbo, supra note 179, at 83-85 (noting non-political factors that con-
tributed to Norway's success, such as racial and cultural homogeneity and un-
deterred foreign oil companies exploiting the oil fields at the detriment of the
host State).
204. See id. at 84-86 (contrasting also the similarities of Norway against other oil-
exporting countries that were victims to the symptoms of the "resource curse,"
such as sharp inflation, large budget deficit, loss of agriculture industry, and
environmental deterioration).
205. See id. 90-91 (highlighting that a Nigerian scholar, Professor Pat Utomi, re-
cently called for a fund system modeled after Norway's Special Petroleum
Fund).
206. See, e.g., Correa, supra note 78, at 16-22 (outlining China and India's efforts
to create a worldwide database of prior art and the Peruvian government's ef-
fort to address the needs of its indigenous communities); see also Merck Case:
Merck-INBio Plant Agreement, available at http://www.american.edulTED/
MERCK.HTM [hereinafter Merck Case] (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) (describing
the Merck-INBio Plant Agreement where the Costa Rica's Ministry of Natural
Resources is successfully using their royalties from the genetic resource-de-
rived products for conservation projects).
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cannot adequately represent the interests of their indigenous communities or
appropriately manage the benefits of bioprospecting concession agreements
to pursue their economic developments and constructive national policies.
A. Long-Term Exclusive Relationship: Addressing the Risks and
Challenges of Bioprospecting
The concession agreement framework effectively accommodates the
long-term relationship that forms between the GR-source states and the bi-
oprospectors. In a concession agreement entered in the context of an extrac-
tive industry, such as oil or mineral, the FPI are faced with two challenges.207
First, the FPI must invest heavily in the initial survey work, exploration, and
prospecting before realizing any substantial returns on their investments.208
Second, there is no guarantee that the FPI will find the desired resource, or
more importantly, sufficient quantities of the desired resource available for
profit.209 The concession agreement is a mechanism that can address these
twin risks of large initial investments and uncertain returns.2 10
To justify the high risks of undertaking an expensive prospecting ven-
ture, the FPI wisely demands an exclusive and long-term relationship that
allows sufficient time to prospect and hopefully collect returns on their in-
vestments. 11 The Abu Dhabi Concession Agreement (Abu Dhabi Agree-
ment) is an example of a simple concession agreement contract that
207. See Asante, supra note 174, at 409, 414 (discussing the need for a "renegoti-
ation" provision to address the unique concerns of a transnational extractive
venture); see, e.g., Michael U. Klein, Bidding for Concessions, WORLD BANK
POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER No. 1957, 3 (August 1998), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=620608 (noting that many concession agreements are
used in the context of infrastructure development such as water utilities and
transport infrastructure).
208. See Asante, supra note 174, at 410 (explaining that FPI may expend anywhere
from five to ten years in initial prospecting work just to discover the desired
resource).
209. See id. (opining that these uncertainties also pose problems for the developing
countries in reaching an agreement as to the tax, royalties, and other imposi-
tions chargeable to the FPI before the value of the desired resource is accu-
rately determined). But see Klein, supra note 207, at 10 (asserting that the
bargaining power of the concession-granting state may improve by employing
a system of bidding for concessions that employs clear rules rather than negoti-
ating on a case-by-case basis).
210. See, e.g., VAGTS ET AL., supra note 169, at 530 (arguing that a "renegotiation"
provision of concession agreement allow the contracting parties to make
changes to the agreement as the uncertainties are resolved over the life of the
agreement).
211. See id. at 532 (noting that even if renegotiation is possible, the FPI and the host
states seek to accommodate the twin concerns of concession agreements in
advance).
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illustrates the ways concession agreements can satisfy the FPI's demand for
long-term exclusivity.212 In Article 2 of the Abu Dhabi Agreement, the state
grants the FPI exclusive rights to "explore, search and drill for, produce,
store, transport, and sell" petroleum, and Article 4 extends this exclusivity
for thirty-five years.2 13 The Abu Dhabi Agreement is not unique in conced-
ing such a long-term exclusive right to the FPI.214 It would be unreasonable
for the FPI to prospect or develop a resource in the concession-granting state
without an exclusive right to exploit that resource.
The bioprospectors face the same concerns. Like the FPIs in extraction
industries, the bioprospectors seek to extract the genetic resources from the
GR-source state's biodiversity.215 To achieve this goal, bioprospectors incur
enormous costs when searching for a potentially useful genetic resource
without any assurance that such a genetic resource exists within the GR-
source state's biodiversity.2 16 While traditional knowledge may lead to a dis-
covery, the concerns of uncertainty and large initial bioprospecting costs
remain.217
Since the concerns are similar, bioprospectors also demand long-term
exclusivity.218 In the bioprospecting context, intellectual property law pro-
vides exclusivity as the patents obtained from the genetic resource-derived
212. See Abu Dhabi Specimen Draft Oil Concession Agreement, reprinted in VAGTS
ET AL., supra note 169 [hereinafter Abu Dhabi Agreement] (printing the con-
cession agreement reached between Alpha Oil Corporation, which is now Occi-
dental Petroleum Corporation, and Government of Abu Dhabi, which is now
United Arab Emirates).
213. Id. at arts. 2, 4.
214. See Al-Naqbi, supra note 169, at 274 (indicating that between 1938 to 1968
Iraq entered into four oil concession agreements with durations that average
62.5 years).
215. See ONG, supra note 26, at 9 (explaining that biological resources have been
recognized as potential source of economic wealth); see generally Arezzo,
supra note 31, at 368-70 (noting that bioprospectors seek plants and herbs,
which are enhanced in value by the traditional knowledge of the local
communities).
216. See, e.g., Arezzo, supra note 31, at 372 (highlighting the importance of tradi-
tional knowledge for bioprospectors to narrow the scope of their search to only
the most promising genetic resources).
217. See id. (opining that that the plant and animal varieties in Brazil, Peru, and
Australia alone represent billions of compounds with countless practical
applications).
218. See, e.g., Eiland, supra note 35, at 46 (stating that the long-term process re-
quired in developing a drug from the raw genetic resource leaves little doubt in
the modem intellectual property regime that genetic resource can become an
intellectual property right).
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products can last as long as twenty-five years.219 Similar to extractive indus-
tries, the long-term relationship220 that can form between the bioprospectors
and the GR-source states through the negotiated bioprospecting concession
agreement and intellectual property law.221
Additionally, the execution of the concession agreements also contrib-
utes to the long-term relationship between the host state and the FPI. Article
7 of the Abu Dhabi Agreement provides that "[a]fter discovery of [the de-
sired resource] ...the [foreign] Company shall proceed to develop .. .all
productive structures, to install the facilities which are necessary to produc-
tion storage and transport and to produce the [desired resource] there-
from."222 As noted previously, concession agreements function as a "joint
public venture."223 Hence, even after discovering the desired resource, there
is a continuing relationship between the FPI and the host state that may entail
cooperative development, exploitation, and use of the discovered natural
resource.
224
This continuing, long-term relationship can also exist between the bi-
oprospectors and the GR-source state following the initial discovery and ex-
ploitation of the genetic resource. The story of oryza longistaminata is
example of how a long-term relationship can arise within the bioprospecting
paradigm.225 Traditional knowledge led a group of researchers from the Uni-
versity of California at Davis to identify and isolate oryza longistaminata,
219. See id. (explaining that the intellectual property regime has been used in the
bioprospecting context with patents).
220. I am assuming here that the bioprospectors are recognizing the permanent sov-
ereignty of the GR-source state over its genetic resources, and thus, an indis-
pensable stakeholder in the bioprospecting paradigm.
221. See Asante, supra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing that concession
agreements function as "joint public ventures"); Kremers, supra note 5, at 22
(opining that the developing countries realize that "however distasteful," intel-
lectual property regime is an established part of the international trade
landscape).
222. Abu Dhabi Agreement, supra note 212, art. 7.
223. See, e.g., Asante, supra note 174, at 403 (asserting that concession agreements
require the host state and the FPI to cooperate in order to develop a strategic
public resource); see generally Ernest E. Smith & John S. Dzienkowski, A
Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petroleum Arrangements, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J.
13, 33-6 (1991) (describing that the traditional bargaining disparity between
the host state and the FPI has diminished and in modem concession agreements
they function as partners in development).
224. See Asante, supra note 174, at 403 (emphasizing that since developing coun-
tries employ concession agreements as part of their "development strategy," the
obligations of the FPI extends further than just prospecting and extracting the
desired resource).
225. See BOOKLET No. 2, supra note 10, at 9 (explaining that oryza longistaminata
is a wild rice growing in Mali).
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which provides disease resistance to certain rice varieties.226 The researchers
and GR-holders reached an agreement for equitable benefit-sharing where
royalties from the genetic resource were used to create the Genetic Resource
Recognition Fund that provides fellowships to agriculture students and re-
searchers from the indigenous communities.27 Like concession agreements
in other contexts, a relationship between the GR-source state and the biopros-
pectors may last long after the initial discovery and extraction of the desired
genetic resource.2 28
In conclusion, due to shared challenges inherent to traditional prospect-
ing and bioprospecting, long-term exclusivity is needed to address the issues
of uncertainty and high investment costs. 229 In addition, a concession agree-
ment may include additional agreements that extend the contractual relation-
ship between the parties beyond just the extraction and utilization of the
desired resource. 230 These similarities make the concession agreement
framework applicable in the bioprospecting context as a legal mechanism to
prevent biopiracy.
B. Defining the Rights and Obligations: Controlling the Conduct of
the Bioprospectors
The concession agreement provides a mechanism for the GR-source
states to impose a measure of control over the bioprospectors while they are
prospecting and once they find the commercially valuable genetic resource.
In other words, the GR-source states can control access to the genetic re-
sources and require equitable benefit-sharing from bioprospectors as a condi-
tion for entering into the concession agreement.2 31 This control is critical
226. See id. (noting that the Bela community developed systemic understanding that
oryza longistaminata has stronger resistance to agricultural diseases such as
rice blight.).
227. See id. at 24 (saying that the bioprospectors were required to pay a certain
percentage of the sales for a specific number of years into the fund with an aim
to build capacity in the indigenous communities).
228. See also Varella, supra note 80, at 9 (saying that the Costa Rican law requires
the bioprospectors to invest in the conservation of the region from which they
extract the genetic resources); CBD, supra note 32, at art. 18 (mandating coop-
eration between the Contracting Parties to any private agreement for access to
genetic resource and its development).
229. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 223, 227, and 229 and accompanying text.
231. See Kohis, supra note 2, at 110-4 (describing that some opponents of biopiracy
do not object to bioprospecting or the use of the genetic resources per se); see
generally Varella, supra note 62, at 9 (detailing that benefit sharing can take
many different forms, such as direct monetary payment, technology transfer,
equipment deliveries, and participation in research).
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because the concession agreement will form a long-term exclusive relation-
ship between the GR-source states and the bioprospectors.232
Historically, developing countries with abundant natural resources faced
a similar need to control the actions of the FPI who sought to exploit natural
resources. 233 Professor Detlev Vagts explains that early concession agree-
ments gave more power to the FPI because the resource-rich states did not
possess the requisite legal experience, financial resources, or the technical
know-how to exploit the natural resources themselves.234 In time, the bal-
ance of power in concession agreements shifted from the FPI to the resource-
rich states. 235 The early concession agreements were modified to limit the
unreasonably long concession periods, exclusive exploitation rights of very
large geographical areas and simplistic, sometimes harmful, contractual
terms agreed to by the resource-rich states.236 The modern concession agree-
ment framework evolved to entail elaborate contractual mechanisms that spe-
cifically define the rights and obligations of the FPI to establish a more
equitable sharing of benefits for the resource-rich states.237
Detailed, contractually defined rights and obligations can remedy the
issue of control over the conduct of the bioprospectors that is central to
preventing biopiracy. The Abu Dhabi Agreement provides examples of the
rights and obligations that a GR-source state can impose on the biopros-
232. See supra notes 224-227 and accompanying text (explaining how a long-term
relationship can form between the GR-holders and the bioprospectors); see also
CBD, supra note 32, at art. 5 (mandating that the Contracting Parties cooperate
to utilize the genetic resources).
233. See VAGTS ET AL., supra note 169, at 529 (insisting that while the FPI's own
motives are for profit, the resource-rich states needs to control the FPI in order
to use the FPI as part of resource-rich states' overall development plan).
234. Id. at 528; see also Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 223, at 17 (noting that in
the 1901 D'Arcy Concession Agreement, the Shah of Persia granted the FPI
exclusive access to 500,000 miles of the country's oil reserves for a period of
60 years); Al-Naqbi, supra note 169, at 6-8 (opining that greed, dash to benefit
from foreign capital, and inexperience in negotiations all contributed toward an
asymmetrical relationship between the FPI and the oil producing countries in
the early oil concession agreements).
235. See, e.g., VAGTS ET AL., supra note 169, at 529 (describing that, for example, in
1950, Saudi Arabia later changed its concession agreements and applied a
50-50 principal to sharing revenues from the extracted oil).
236. See id.
237. See, e.g., Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 223, at 26-7 (arguing that the
covenants in concession agreements helped to balance the rights of the FPI and
the resource-rich states); see also DELMON, supra note 170, at 253-4 (catego-
rizing broadly the interests of the resource-rich states as defined completion
date, performance, maintenance regime, and construction/operation of the pro-
ject in a semi-public venture).
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pectors.2 38 For instance, Article 2 of the Abu Dhabi Agreement confers
rights to the FPI only for the contracted petroleum resource. 239 Furthermore,
Article I imposes geographic restrictions on the FPI to conduct their pros-
pecting activities.240 Moreover, Article 3 unambiguously states that any
other resources that the FPI may find, such as natural gas, belong exclusively
to the resource-rich states, denying the FPI of any rights to these unintended
resources. 24' Together these provisions effectively give the resource-rich
states control to regulate access to their natural resources by defining what
resources the FPI can take and where they may take it from.242 Moreover,
resource-rich states may force the FPI to accept "work obligations" that place
the FPI on a specific timeline to begin and conclude their prospecting and
resource-extracting activities.243 The GR-source states can apply these provi-
sions to the bioprospecting concession agreements in order to force the bi-
oprospectors to disclose the specific genetic resources that they seek to
extract, limit the access to only those particular genetic resources, restrict the
bioprospectors to a defined geographical area, and guarantee that the biopros-
pectors are actively developing the genetic resources.2 44
Further, the concession agreement framework gives additional control to
the GR-source states by requiring the bioprospectors to share the benefits
derived from the genetic resources. The Abu Dhabi Agreement has clearly
defined compensation mechanisms and royalties that the FPI must pay based
on their right to prospect, upon discovery of the desired resource, and once
the extractions are underway.245 Also, the concession agreements set the
238. Abu Dhabi Agreement, supra note 212 (explaining rights and obligations states
can impose).
239. Id. at art. 2 ("[E]xclusive rights to explore, search, and drill for, produce .
sell Petroleum within the Concession Area."); see also id. at art. I (defining the
term "Concession Area").
240. Id. at art. I (establishing the "Concession Area" as 7685.66 km2 of the UAE).
241. Id. at art. 3 (agreeing that all natural gases discovered or produced in the Con-
cession Area do not belong to the FPI).
242. See supra notes 238-41 (explaining how states can gain control of their
resources).
243. Abu Dhabi Agreement, supra note 212, at art. 6 (mandating that the FPI begin
prospecting for petroleum in the Concession Area within months and begin
extraction within two years from the date of the concession agreement).
244. But see infra Part IV (noting that a long-term exclusive relationship with only
one private entity may actually hinder scientific innovation and economic de-
velopment, and thus, be detrimental to society and the GR-source state).
245. Abu Dhabi Agreement, supra note 212, at art. 10-11, 13 (implementing bonus
payments, annual rentals, and royalty payments to the concession agreement);
see, e.g., AI-Naqbi supra note 169, at 251 (declaring that the FPI is subject to
certain penalties/sanctions for failing to act according to their contractual
obligations).
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terms of relinquishment of the rights, mandate best conservation practices,
and restrict the use of incidental resources, such as land and water.2 46 The
GR-source state can use these mechanisms to control the conduct of the pros-
pectors while they are bioprospecting and once they find the commercially
valuable genetic resource.
There are numerous examples of the flexibility in creating equitable
benefit-sharing regimes through private agreements in the bioprospecting
context. Under the Provisionary Measure n.2.052, Brazil mandates that any
contract for access to the GRITK include a clause pertaining to technology
transfer.247 At the same time, such contractual agreements should allocate
intellectual property rights equitably between the GR-source state and bi-
oprospectors. 248 In another example, as part of the access contract to the
genetic resources, the International Cooperative Diversity Group contract in
Nigeria obliges bioprospectors to pay a certain percentage of revenues de-
rived from the genetic resources to the local communities.2 49 Lastly, Costa
Rican law requires bioprospectors to help support conservation of the region
from where they extracted the genetic resources.2 50 As these examples illus-
trate, the GR-source states can actively take advantage of the flexibility of
concession agreements to formulate equitable benefit-sharing regimes that
fits their specific needs and policies.
Hence, the concession agreement contractual provisions that evolved to
control the FPI in the traditional resource prospecting context can work to
control access to the genetic resources and ensure equitable benefit sharing in
the bioprospecting context, thereby satisfying the objectives of the GR-
246. Id. at arts. 12, 14, 21 (providing that the FPI relinquish 25% of the developed
concession area every three to five years to the host State, which accomplishes
the development-strategy goals of the concession agreement).
247. Varella, supra note 80, at 9. But see Carvalho, supra note 127, at 154-6 (opin-
ing that a contractual relationship establishing prospectively a regime for equi-
table benefit sharing may be unfair to the bioprospectors because the true value
of the genetic resources will not be available until many years later when the
research, testing, and commercialization of the genetic resource are completed).
248. Tania Bubela et al., Respecting, Promoting, and Protecting Traditional Knowl-
edge: A Comparative Case Study of Brazil, Kenya, and Northern Canada
25-27 (International Expert Group on Biotechnology, Innovation and Intellec-
tual Property), available at http://www.theinnovationpartnership.org/data/ieg/
documents/cases/TIP_ KCaseStudy.pdf (explaining that in the
Bioamaz6nia-Novartis bilateral agreement negotiated in 2000 but was ulti-
mately rejected, Novartis as the FPI held exclusive intellectual property rights
over the genetic resource-derived products in exchange for considerable mone-
tary compensation and obligations to train Brazilian scientists).
249. Varella, supra note 80, at 9.
250. Id.
2010]
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
source states. 251 A concession agreement framework directly addresses bi-
opiracy by providing the GR-holders with mandatory control and permissive
equitable benefit-sharing for their genetic resources, while simultaneously
ensuring the bioprospectors maintain continued access to the genetic
resources. 252
C. Economic Development: Promoting the Resource Use Policy of
the Biodiversity-rich States
In many instances, the geographical areas with the greatest biological
diversity and traditional knowledge are located in developing countries of
great economic poverty, political instability, exploitation, and biological and
environmental degradation.253 As a result, these developing countries,
predominantly located in the Southern Hemisphere, cannot utilize their own
resources because they do not have the requisite legal system, economic ca-
pacity, and technical and human resources. 254
In advocating for TRIPS, the developed countries argued that a stronger,
global intellectual property regime (IPR) would "foster technology and in-
vestment flows to developing countries," which would consequently promote
their trade and economic developments.55 This hypothesis is true for those
251. See generally DELMON, supra note 170, at 253-54 (implying that through equi-
table benefit sharing regimes of bonus, rentals, royalties, and profit-sharing, the
resource-rich states can receive tremendous financial capital from exploiting
their natural resources); Biodiversity Law No.7788, supra note 59.
252. See Longacre, supra notes 3, at 167.
253. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty:
New Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous
Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 59, 94 (1998) (noting that the human and biological conditions are di-
rectly related to one another in conservation of biological resources, and thus,
material wealth); see, e.g., MGBEOJI, supra note 62, at 61 (reporting that over
two thirds of the planet's existing plant species are located in the Southern
Hemisphere).
254. See supra Part I.B (describing the important commercial mechanism that led to
the current North-Side divide of economic wealth); Coombe, supra note 253, at
94-95 (opining that a simple system of property rights that brings the indige-
nous communities in developing countries into greater contact with developed
countries may exacerbate the complex problems of poverty and biodiversity
conservation for those countries).
255. See CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY QUESTIONs 23-24
(Zed Books Ltd. 2000) [hereinafter POLICY QUESTIONS] (stating that empirical
evidence are beginning to show that the promises of developed countries are
not materializing); Kremers, supra note 5, at 19 (contending that strong intel-
lectual property laws may increase the current income and development dispar-
ities between the North and South).
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developing countries that are past a certain development threshold, but re-
mains unproven for those countries that are less developed.256 For "advanced
developing countries," an IPR will not only positively influence trade, but
also promote increased access to technology, improved welfare, enhanced
global efficiency, and more robust industrial development.257 Figure 1 and
Figure 2 illustrate the beneficial effects of adopting an IPR for those
countries beyond a certain development threshold.258 These two figures
show a strong correlation between increased economic and intellectual prop-
erty-protecting activities in South Korea and China.259 In interpreting these
figures, it is important to note that they only demonstrate a correlation and
not a cause-and-effect relationship. Nevertheless, among the advanced de-
veloping nations, the figures below strongly support the general proposition
that increased IPR can promote trade and economic development.2 60
The developing countries fully understand this relationship between in-
tellectual property-protecting capability and economic development. Profes-
sor Daniel Gervais explains that the "only true measures" obtained by the
developing countries during the TRIPS negotiations, in addition to Articles 7
and 8, were special "transition periods" to effectuate the TRIPS standards
into their national laws.261 These two articles mandate that there be a "trans-
fer and dissemination of technology ... in a manner conducive to the social
256. See CORREA, supra note 255, at 24 (noting that South Korea, China, Mexico,
Argentina, and Brazil are countries that are "advanced" in its industrialization
process).
257. See id. (arguing that due to the wide disparities among developing countries,
accurately measuring the economic effect of TRIPS will be difficult).
258. WIPO: Statistics on Patents, http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents
(last visited Sept. 14, 2010) (download the file "Patent grants by patent office
(1883-2008) by resident and non-resident" under the Section "Patents
Granted"); WTO: Statistic Database, http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalPrograml
WSDBStatProgramSeries.aspx?Language=E&subtopic=m; tv (last visited
Sept. 14, 2010) (select "Total Merchandise Trade" and run through the selec-
tion process by country, "World," variable: "Exports," and yearclick on
"Trade Profiles" and run through the selection process by country, years, and
variable: "Exports").
259. "Exports" was used as a variable to determine the economic capacity because
exports can be indicative of the presence of a nation in world trade. See gener-
ally, Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State
of Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 505, 505 (2005) (noting that a "marriage" of
intellectual property and trade rules will subject intellectual property rules to be
interpreted from economic perspectives); CORREA, supra note 255, at 28 (stat-
ing that the importance to national economies of intellectual property-related
industries reside in the fact that they export).
260. See Gervais, supra note 260, at 505 (explaining that TRIPS will lead to trade
liberalization, which is a means to an end toward promoting economic growth).
261. See Gervais, supra note 260, at 509.
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PATENT/ExPORT GROWTH (SOUTH KOREA 1985-2008)
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Figure 1: Demonstrating the relationship between rise in exports and the correspond-
ing rise in patent capability (number of patents granted) in South Korea, an advanced
developing country.
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Figure 2: Demonstrating the relationship between rise in exports and the correspond-
ing rise in patent (number of patents granted) capability in China, an advanced devel-
oping country.
and economic welfare."262 Even though an IPR may not independently or
positively influence development-related activities, it can be presumed that
262. TRIPS, supra note 133, at art. 7 (outlining the objective of the TRIPS
Agreement).
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developing countries agreed to TRIPS because some level of IPR is needed
in order to achieve optimal level of economic development. 263
However, recent studies are beginning to show that-unlike the ad-
vanced developing countries-enhanced IPR does not necessarily promote
economic development for those non-advanced developing countries that fre-
quently possess the richest sources of biodiversity.264 To explain this obser-
vation, Professor Correa suggests that in non-advanced developing countries,
the impact of increased IPR will mainly influence the market prices of prod-
ucts exported by the developed countries into the developing countries. 265
Concurrently, the developing countries in the South would incur losses for
which the developed countries in the North must subsequently compen-
sate. 266 Moreover, he argues that increased IPR may lead to "scientific and
technological protectionism" that may actually reduce the dissemination of
technology transfer to the developing countries that are currently playing a
"catching-up" process.267 Nevertheless, Professor Gervais recommends that
based on lack of sufficient empirical data and for practical reasons TRIPS
(hence, increased IPR) should be "seen, and accepted, as a given" in the
modern international legal system.2 68 Therefore, the developing countries
should accept that an enhanced IPR may not promote their economic devel-
263. See Gervais, supra note 260, at 534 (questioning whether an IPR will benefit
the truly poorer nations); Kremers, supra note 5, at 19 (noting that the debate
on the positive or negative effects of an IPR on developing countries are occur-
ring not only at the WIPO but also on variety of other international forums,
such as the World Trade Organization).
264. See CORREA, supra note 255, at 25 (arguing that the poorest countries should
not expect to gain any welfare benefits from an enhanced IPR).
265. See id. at 24-29 (arguing that an IPR will unlikely affect the transnational
corporations' decision on foreign direct investment flows or location of their
Research & Development facilities abroad in the developing countries).
266. See id. at 25 (limiting this conclusion to only those intellectual properties con-
sidered to be "substantial innovations").
267. See id. at 31-32 (explaining that transnational corporations are reluctant to
share their technologies because transferring technologies will lead to reduced
bargaining positions, higher global competition, and limited marginal advan-
tages); see also Kremers, supra note 5, at 20-21 (reporting that many scholars
doubt that without a strong technological base of its own, the developing coun-
tries could effectively compete with the foreign companies who hold monopoly
powers on patents pursuant to TRIPS).
268. See Gervais, supra note 260, at 534-35 (noting that developing countries are
engaging in TRIPS Plus Bilateral trade discussions instead of rejecting or fight-
ing against TRIPS); see also Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property Engineering:
The Role of the Chemical, Pharmaceutical, and Biotechnology Industries, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 258, 260 (Burton Ong
ed., 2004) (clarifying that TRIPS sets a minimum standard of intellectual prop-
erty protection that all signatories must conform).
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opment by itself under the current TRIPS framework, as they had originally
hoped during the TRIPS negotiations. Instead, the developing countries must
look to alternative methods of economic development.
As developing countries, the GR-source states should resort to the con-
cession agreement framework that, by design, guarantees technology trans-
fers and other economic-development activities. Professor James Hyde
believes that a concession agreement is more accurately labeled as an "inter-
national economic development agreement" because the FPIs assist the host
states in developing their natural resources. 269 Further, Professor Samuel
Asante notes that concession agreements are "hardly distinguishable from a
development plan."270 Once again, the Abu Dhabi Agreement illustrates the
"development plan" aspects of concession agreements. 271 Under Article 7,
the FPIs are obligated to develop the petroleum industry for the host state,
which requires the FPI to "develop ... all productive structures [and] facili-
ties . . . necessary to production, storage . . . transport and to produce [the
desired resource]."272 Further, through royalties, annual rents, bonus pay-
ments, and taxes, the host state secures foreign finance that is similar to a
foreign direct investment (FDI) over a lengthy thirty-five year period, which
is the duration of the Abu Dhabi Agreement.2 73 More importantly, conces-
sion agreements foster human resources in the host states. Under Article 24,
the FPIs must give "priority to the citizens" of the host state when hiring
employees, and under Article 26, the FPIs are required to provide the em-
ployees with education and training in various aspects of the industry includ-
ing "technical, supervisory and management training."274 Therefore,
concession agreements can function as an instrument of public policy that the
GR-source states can actively utilize to effectuate their national economic
and development agendas.
The private agreement between Merck, Inc. and the Costa Rican gov-
ernment illustrates how a GR-source state can employ concession agreements
269. See Hyde, supra note 177, at 862 (justifying this label because of the conces-
sion agreement's long duration and the FPI's technical assistance involved);
see also DELMON, supra note 170, at 251 (proclaiming that concession agree-
ments are the "backbone" of a public-private partnership projects).
270. Asante, supra note 174, at 403 (observing the semi-public nature of concession
agreements between a government and a foreign partner in developing strategic
resources or building vital public utilities such as a water-treatment plant).
271. See Abu Dhabi Agreement, supra note 212 and accompanying text.
272. Id. at 535, at art. 7; see generally Klein, supra note 207, at 1-2 (explaining the
various types of concession agreements, such as "build-lease-transfer" and
"build-operate-transfer" models that can be negotiated between the FPI and the
concession-granting states).
273. Id. at arts. 10, 11, 13, 17.
274. Id. at arts. 24, 26.
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as a tool for economic development.75 In that agreement, the Costa Rican
government successfully utilized their genetic resources to secure FDI-like
financial resources and improved capacity for indigenous development and
exploitation of their genetic resources.276 Specifically, Merck gave the Costa
Rican government $1 million as an initial fee and promised one to three
percent royalties from the commercialized products based on the genetic re-
sources.27 7 In addition, the Costa Rican government received $135,000
worth of laboratory equipment and Merck's promise to build several research
facilities in Costa Rica.278 Finally, this agreement led to human resources
development whereby Merck trained its Costa Ricans employees. Hence, the
GR-source states can use bioprospecting concession agreements to develop
their economic capabilities and capitalize on their abundant genetic
resources.
Professor Gervais, along with other scholars, agrees that it is unclear as
to whether TRIPS will have any positive economic effect for the truly poor
countries which include many of the GR-source states.279 However, eco-
nomic development is important not only for the welfare of the GR-source
states but also for protecting their own genetic resources from misappropria-
tion.280 Hence, instead of depending on the uncertain promises of TRIPS and
an enhanced IPR, GR-source states should employ the concession agreement
framework to ensure that they can actively develop their natural resources
according to their public policies and economic development plans.
275. See Kohls, supra note 2, at 128 (explaining that the agreement was between
Merck & Co., Inc, a U.S. pharmaceutical company, and 1NBio, an agency of
the Costa Rican government).
276. See Merck Case, supra note 206 (describing a two-year agreement in which
INBio, a non-profit agency of the Costa-Rican government, will supply Merck
with samples of plants, insects, and microorganisms from Costa Rica's pro-
tected rainforests). But see Hamilton, supra note 19 (criticizing the Merck/
INBio agreement as a "'Trojan Horse' use[d] to gain entrance to the country to
plunder its riches.").
277. See Merck Case, supra note 206 (noting that Merck would have the right to use
these samples to create pharmaceutical products).
278. See Kohls, supra note 2, at 128 (stating that INBio was required to give half of
the royalties to the Ministry of Natural Resources, for use in conservation of
rainforests).
279. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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D. Renegotiating Provisions: Incorporating a Method to Correct for
Inequities in a Bioprospecting Concession Agreement
In bioprospecting concession agreements, bioprospectors and GR-hold-
ers form a long-term relationship.281 But it is often difficult for either party
to negotiate for every aspect of the concession agreement or prepare for
every contingency in a relationship that may last twenty years-the life of a
patent in the United States-or longer.282 This difficulty is more pronounced
in the bioprospecting context because the FPI often holds the greater bargain-
ing position. For instance, because the contracting parties must estimate the
value of the genetic resource before the bioprospectors find and develop it,
they may not be aware of its real value.283 Even if the bioprospectors have
knowledge of the genetic resource's true value, they may not need to disclose
that information to the GR-holders.284
Therefore, the uncertainty inherent to the bioprospecting paradigm in-
creases the likelihood that GR-source states may agree to inequitable benefit-
sharing arrangements.2 85 GR-source states may agree to suboptimal agree-
ment terms because of their immediate need to attract capital and human
resources. 286 Also, the bioprospectors often share a portion of political risks
such as wars, nationwide strikes, and governmental instability.287 The politi-
281. See Arezzo, supra note 31, at 372-73. (describing that a long-term relationship
arises out of the necessity to justify the high cost of bioprospecting and the
uncertainty of finding a valuable genetic resource).
282. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2007) (stating that the patent term begins "on the date
on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the
application for the patent was filed in the United States.").
283. Eiland, supra note 35, at 69 (noting that the bargaining advantage of the FPI
may lead to undervaluation of the genetic resources and the associated tradi-
tional knowledge).
284. See Carvalho, supra note 127, at 154-55 (explaining that the buyer has no duty
to disclose to the vendor the circumstances that make the property valuable);
see, e.g., Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178, 194 (1817) (holding that vendee is not
bound to communicate to the vendor of goods extrinsic circumstances which
might influence the value of the goods).
285. Kohls, supra note 2, at 112 and accompanying text (highlighting the low
probability of finding a commercially valuable genetic resources through
bioprospecting).
286. See supra notes 271-274 and accompanying text (explaining that concession
agreements can be used as a FDI-like financial resource and mechanism for a
developing countries' economic-development).
287. See DELMON, supra note 170, at 254 (advocating that the risks should be allo-
cated to the party best able to manage it, and thus, political risks should be
borne by the concession-granting state); see generally Coombe, supra note 253,
at 93-96 (arguing that frequently, the regions with the greatest biological diver-
sity is also regions of great poverty and political instability).
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cal risk is greater in developing countries, so bioprospectors may demand
unreasonable concessions from GR-source states for investing in those
states. 288 However, once the uncertainties are resolved during the course of
the bioprospecting concession agreement and the true values of the genetic
resources are revealed, GR-holders may find that their original private agree-
ment is as unfair and unjust as biopiracy itself.289
The concession agreement framework allows for the renegotiation of the
original agreement and, therefore, provides a mechanism to address any ineq-
uities that may arise during the agreement period. Professor Asante explains
that the renegotiation provision is an "integral feature" of concession agree-
ments not only because of the economic concerns, but also to encourage con-
cession agreements in the future.290 Without a renegotiation provision,
resource-rich states will be reluctant to engage in concession agreements and,
consequently, the FPI will not have access to valuable natural resources. 29 1
This access restriction may encourage bioprospectors to devise ways to mis-
appropriate the genetic resources and thus, to perpetuate biopiracy.292 There-
fore, the opportunity to renegotiate within the concession agreement
framework mutually benefits both bioprospectors and GR-holders.293 At the
same time, renegotiation provisions provide each party with the flexibility to
monitor the equity concerns that may arise during the long life of a biopros-
pecting concession agreement.
288. See DELMON, supra note 170, at 255 (noting, however, that the FPI, not the
concession-granting states, bear the brunt of the political risks when engaged in
public-private partnership projects in developed countries with stable govern-
ment and economies).
289. See VAGTS ET AL., supra note 169 at 528 (arguing that the resolution of uncer-
tainties over time is a predictable trajectory of any concession agreement). But
see Klein, supra note 207, at 10 (arguing that granting concessions to FPI
through a system of bidding for the public-private partnership project can level
the bargaining-power disparity between the concession-granting state and the
FPI at the negotiation stage).
290. See Asante, supra note 174, at 413 (suggesting that the State, as a sovereign
entity, can expropriate the FPI's investments to cure the perceived inequity,
and a renegotiation provision can prevent this outcome in which the FPI has no
effective remedy).
291. See id. at 411-12 (implying that a renegotiation provision invites capital, on
reasonable terms, and with the power to modify or terminate a concession
agreement).
292. See Kohls, supra note 2, at 120-21 (identifying company in India who fought
for ouster of bioprospectors now but now holds multiple patents on genetic
resource that was in question and does not provide profits to TK holders).
293. See Al-Naqbi, supra note 169, at 10 (illustrating that the nationalization of the
oil fields in Iran during the 1950s was a direct result of failed renegotiations to
resolve the inequities of the earlier, original oil concession agreements).
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E. Arbitrating Disputes: Providing a Mechanism for Dispute
Resolution through ICSID
Disputes between parties can arise in any contractual relationship, and
concession agreements are no exception. In fact, it can be argued that dis-
putes are more likely in a concession agreement context because of the long-
term relationship that forms between the contracting parties,294 political risks
associated with investing substantially in developing countries,295 and the un-
certainties inherent in prospecting for valuable natural resources. 296 To facil-
itate the formation of concession agreements, an effective dispute resolution
mechanism provides a measure of certainty, predictability, and mutual confi-
dence between the parties, which promotes compliance with their respective
contractual obligations.297 Because a concession agreement is a semi-public
venture involving a sovereign state and a foreign private investor, a unique
arbitration mechanism is available through the International Convention for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) to ensure that the contracting
parties efficiently and timely resolve their disputes.
ICSID can serve as a powerful dispute resolution mechanism in the bi-
oprospecting context. ICSID was formed under the auspices of the World
Bank as an instrument of international policy for promoting foreign private
investment and economic development in developing countries.298 Toward
this end, ICSID is devoted to foreign private investor-sovereign state dispute
settlements and serves as an international arbitration mechanism that is a
"complete, exclusive and closed jurisdictional system, insulated from na-
tional laws."299 ICSID protects the foreign investors from unilateral actions
of host states-such as expropriation-that may jeopardize their invest-
ments. Thus, ICSID reduces the political risks of investing in developing
countries.300 As an independent and neutral dispute resolution mechanism,
ICSID shields the host states-often developing countries-from economic
manipulation by developed countries.301 Hence, ICSID creates a "level play-
294. See Asante, supra note 174, at 410.
295. See Coombe, supra note 253, at 94-96.
296. See Kohls, supra note 2, at 111-12.
297. See Vincent 0. Orlu Nmehielle, Enforcing Arbitration Awards Under the Inter-
national Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Conven-
tion), 7 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 21, 23 (2001) (reporting that one
impetus for creating ICSID was to establish the mutual confidence between
contracting parties).
298. Id. at 22.
299. Giuliana Cane, The Enforcement of ICSID Awards: Revolutionary or Ineffec-
tive?, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 439, 442 (2004).
300. Orlu Nmehielle, supra note 297, at 23.
301. Id.; see, e.g., Dinesh D. Banani, Note, International Arbitration and Project
Finance in Developing Countries: Blurring the Public/Private Distinction, 26
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ing field" in international economic relations for foreign private investors
and host states.302
However, consenting to the jurisdiction of ICSID excludes all other
remedies; therefore, there is no exception to the final, binding character of an
ICSID award.303 Consequently, domestic courts of the respective parties to
the dispute are required to recognize the ICSID award-which serves the
effect of res judicata-and they must ensure that the ICSID awards are en-
forced.304 Furthermore, submission to arbitration is construed as a waiver by
the host state of sovereign immunity on jurisdiction matters and certain other
proceedings.305 This binding characteristic is unique to ICSID and serves to
separate it from other arbitration mechanisms.306 With 156 signatories cur-
rently,307 ICSID has become the forum of choice for settling commercial dis-
putes that arise between foreign private investors and sovereign states.
The benefit to bioprospectors and GR-source states of having access to a
neutral forum with the authority to issue final and binding awards needs no
elaboration. The critical issue here is to determine whether ICSID is availa-
ble for GR-source states and bioprospectors to resolve disputes which may
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 355, 361 (2003) (describing that in international
project finance agreements, developed countries have a clear preference for
their domestic courts in New York or London applying the New York or En-
glish laws to the dispute).
302. See Orlu Nmehielle, supra note 297, at 23 (explaining that the ICSID Rules of
Arbitration contributes to forming this balance).
303. Cane, supra note 299, at 442 (stating that an ICSID award is considered as a
final judgment in the courts of the respective parties without regard to domestic
laws).
304. See id. at 445 (observing that in non-ICSID awards, domestic courts often used
the recognitionlexequatur procedures to deprive the arbitral tribunal of its juris-
diction to hear the dispute); see generally Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States art. 54(1),
Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Conven-
tion] ("Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to
this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations . . . as if it
were a final judgment of a court in that State.").
305. Cane, supra note 299, at 446 (concluding sovereign immunity is waived for
jurisdiction issues and certain other proceedings based on articles 54 and 55 of
ICSID).
306. See, e.g., id. at 440-41 (contrasting ICSID to the Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards-more commonly known as
the "New York Convention").
307. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of Contracting
States and Other Signatories of the Convention, http://icsid.worldbank.org/IC-
SID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ContractingStates&
ReqForm=Main (choose English, French, or Spanish PDF) (last visited Oct. 1,
2010).
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arise in bioprospecting concession agreements. Article 25(1) of ICSID out-
lines the bases for jurisdiction under ICSID, stating that "the jurisdiction...
shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, be-
tween a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency ... ) and
a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute con-
sent in writing to submit to the Centre.308
Hence, jurisdiction is based on three criteria. First, the legal dispute
must arise out of an investment activity. The term "investment" is inter-
preted broadly in order to encompass a wide range of international business
transactions rather than solely commercial trade in the traditional sense.309
Second, the legal dispute must involve a sovereign state and a foreign na-
tional.310 A bioprospecting concession agreement easily meets both of these
two requirements because it is a public-private venture between a GR-source
state and a foreign bioprospector. 31" In addition, a bioprospecting concession
agreement is an investment because its primary purpose is to allow prospect-
ing for valuable genetic resources for commercial exploitation by a foreign
prospector, while also serving to promote the economic development of the
GR-source state. 312 Third, the requirement of mutual consent to the jurisdic-
tion of ICSID can easily be satisfied during the negotiation of the biopros-
pecting concession agreement. 31 3 Therefore, if the GR-source states and the
bioprospectors so choose, ICSID is available as an effective and binding dis-
pute resolution mechanism, which gives the bioprospecting concession
agreements strong legal force.
Despite its numerous advantages, however, many scholars and commen-
tators have criticized ICSID because execution of an ICSID award against the
host state depends upon the immunity rules prevailing in the country in
which execution is sought.314 Article 55 of ICSID explicitly states that
308. ICSID Convention, supra note 304, at art. 25(1) (emphasis added).
309. See Orlu Nmehielle, supra note 297, at 26 (arguing that the drafters of ICSID
intentionally left the term "investment" undefined to accord to it a more flexi-
ble interpretation).
310. See generally ICSID Convention, supra note 304, at art. 25(2) (defining "Na-
tional of another Contracting State").
311. See Latin American Alliance, supra note 16, at 3.
312. Orlu Nmehielle, supra note 297, at 26.
313. Id.
314. See, e.g., id. at 30-1 (providing that ICSID distinguishes recognition, enforce-
ment, and execution of the ICSID award); see also Liberian Eastern Timber
Corp. v. Republic of Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73, 74-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (making
the three distinctions of the ICSID award). But see France: Court of Cassation
Decision in Soabi (Seutin) v. Senegal (Recognition and Enforcement of Award
in the Context of the ICSID Convention), June i, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1167,
1167-68 (noting that the Paris Court of Appeals did not distinguish between
enforceability and execution of the award).
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"[n]othing... shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any
Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State
from execution."315 In other words, even though the GR-source state must
recognize and ensure that ICSID awards are enforced, it may nevertheless
evade execution of ICSID awards against its own property by hiding behind
the defense of sovereign immunity.316 Meanwhile, ICSID awards against the
bioprospectors can readily be enforced and executed.317 In effect, ICSID cre-
ates a loophole that favors the interests of sovereign parties over those of the
foreign investors.318
This disparity certainly can undermine the effectiveness of ICSID as a
dispute-resolution mechanism. After all, what good is an award if there is no
way to collect it? However, there are three reasons why this inequality of
treatment of parties may not materially affect ICSID as a dispute-resolution
mechanism in the bioprospecting context. First, the vast majority of awards
are voluntarily complied with in transnational arbitrations. 319 Second, GR-
source state will strive to comply with the ICSID award to maintain its
reputational capital within the international community as a safe place for
bioprospectors to invest now and in the future.320 Third, as Article 55 of
ICSID makes clear, execution of the ICSID award depends on the domestic
laws of the contracting State. Hence, when an ICSID award is in favor of
bioprospectors, they can resort to forum-shopping for execution against the
assets of the non-complying GR-source state.32'
While ICSID is certainly not perfect, it is important to realize that in the
concession agreement framework, there exists a ready, effective, and binding
system of dispute resolution mechanism for GR-source states and biopros-
pectors that is unavailable in other contexts, such as in private bilateral agree-
315. ICSID Convention, supra note 304, at art. 55 (emphasis added).
316. See Orlu Nmehielle, supra note 297, at 36; but see id. at 34-35 (expanding on
Van den Berg's argument that it is illogical for the sovereign state that consents
to ICSID to waive immunity with respect to jurisdiction and enforcement but
not on execution).
317. Id. at 30.
318. Id. at 31.
319. See Cane, supra note 299, at 439 (hypothesizing that the topic of enforcement
escaped analysis from scholars and commentators because awards are so fre-
quently complied with by the parties).
320. See id. at 447 (reporting that the legislative history of ICSID shows that the
drafters did not consider states to be in danger of defaulting because of their
need to maintain international reputational capital).
321. See id. at 457 (opining that "the only option available to a private party is to
find a restrictive application of the immunity doctrine."), quoting Vincent 0.
Orlu Nmehielle, Enforcing Arbitration Awards Under the International Con-
vention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention), 7
ANN.SURV. INT'L & CoMp. L. 21, 30 (2001).
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ments. Hence, for both bioprospectors and GR-source states, ICSID can
provide a unique and indispensable dispute settlement system.
IV. TOWARDS A PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE CONCESSION
AGREEMENT FRAMEWORK: SOME ISSUES
THAT MUST BE RESOLVED
The path to our destination is not always a straight one. We go down the
wrong road, we get lost, we turn back. Maybe it doesn't matter which road
we embark on. Maybe what matters is that we embark.
-Barbara Hall322
Part III of this paper outlined the benefits and feasibility of applying the
concession agreement framework to prevent the misappropriation of genetic
resources by the bioprospectors. 323 In assessing the potential effectiveness of
the concession agreement framework in this paper, some important consider-
ations toward a practical application of this framework in the bioprospecting
context have been omitted thus far. Next, this paper explores two such con-
siderations relating to the issues of a state's permanent sovereignty over the
genetic resources and the long-term exclusive bioprospecting duration.
The most important premise underlying the use of the concession agree-
ment framework in bioprospecting is the GR-source state's permanent sover-
eignty over its biodiversity.324 However, this underlying premise raises
important questions that cannot be ignored. First, there are two different
levels of control over the bioprospectors, while the concession agreement
framework may only address one.325 Specifically, the CBD recognizes that
states have sovereign rights over their natural resources; 326 therefore, the
CBD imposes obligations to adopt national legislation to restrict access to the
biological resources. 327 This legislation may be unrelated and prior to the
intellectual property system concerns or any of the other legal mechanisms
that might be imposed following access, such as prior informed consent, in
322. Northern Exposure: Rosebud (CBS television broadcast Nov. 8, 1993).
323. Supra Part III.
324. See supra Part III.A (highlighting that for a concession agreement framework
to be applicable, the state must have rights over its genetic resources which can
be through the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources or
through a "trusteeship").
325. See CBD, supra note 32, at art. 15.1.
326. Id. ("Recognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources, the
authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with the national gov-
ernments and is subject to national legislation."); Latin American Alliance,
supra note 16 (opining that the CBD creates a "boost for bilateralism.").
327. CBD, supra note 32, at art. 8(j).
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order to prevent biopiracy.328 Hence, the national legislation provides the
first level of control over the bioprospectors which may obligate the biopros-
pectors to employ a bilateral private agreement for the right to access the
genetic resources. However, such access agreements between the GR-re-
source state and bioprospectors are already prevalent,329 and the concession
agreement framework may offer few additional advantages at this level.
Assuming that the national legislation provides this first level of control,
the concession agreement framework may only provide a second level of
control that affords GR-holders an opportunity to formulate specific condi-
tions for mandatory control over bioprospectors and permissive, equitable
benefit-sharing. In other words, the concession agreement framework con-
cerns the post-access behavior of bioprospectors.330 Due to these dual levels
of control, the concession agreement framework might not be used because
bioprospectors are not obligated to employ it absent national legislation man-
dating its use once access to the genetic resources has been granted through
other means. Therefore, as a second level of control, the concession agree-
ment framework may not be able to address the unauthorized access to the
genetic resources that leads to biopiracy.331
Secondly, the concept of permanent sovereignty is ambiguous as to the
status of the rights of the indigenous communities who are the traditional
custodians of the genetic resources and the associated traditional knowledge.
Prior to the CBD, biodiversity had been considered a "heritage of mankind,"
and at the local level, a "cultural and economic heritage of the people."332
Vesting the rights of the genetic resources and the associated traditional
knowledge exclusively to the GR-source states may extinguish the claims of
328. Interview with Joshua Samoff, Professor of the Practice of Law, Wash. Univ.
Coll.s of Law, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Sarnoff Interview].
But see CBD, supra note 32, at art. 15.5 (mandating that "[alccess to genetic
resources shall be subject to prior informed consent of the Contracting Party
providing such resources.").
329. See, e.g., Latin American Alliance, supra note 16 (discussing that, for example,
the National Cancer Institute has signed bioprospecting access agreements with
several countries); Ragavan, supra note I, at 514 (noting that countries such as
Costa Rica, Brazil, and India are making efforts to regulate access to the ge-
netic resources through bilateral agreements but emphasizes the varying level
of commitment of each country).
330. Sarnoff Interview, supra note 328.
331. Id.; but see supra Part III.C (arguing that negotiating for access is a part of the
concession agreement, and thus, in a concession agreement framework, the bi-
oprospectors' right to access as well as their post-access behaviors are encom-
passed within a single framework).
332. See GRAIN-2, supra note 39 (questioning the appropriateness of privatizing
biodiversity).
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the indigenous communities of their rights to the GR/TK, and thereby calls
into question the proper scope of term "GR-holders."333
Finally, the concession agreement framework embodies a "top-down
model" in which critical decisions concerning access, benefit-sharing, preser-
vation of traditional knowledge and lifestyle, and conservation of natural re-
sources are made by politicians, scientists, and corporate entities.334 As one
commentator opined about such a top-down model, "the vast majority of lo-
cal populations [are] left alienated in the periphery to receive the benefits if
they ever trickle down."335 Further, a top-down model of the concession
agreement brings into question the role and rights of the indigenous commu-
nities in marketing, preserving, conserving, developing, and in some cases,
defending their genetic resources and traditional knowledge.336
These three important questions, relating to the recognition of perma-
nent sovereignty over the genetic resources, must be explored further in order
for the concession agreement framework to become truly applicable in the
bioprospecting context.
In addition to the concept of permanent sovereignty over genetic re-
sources, the concession agreement framework requires a long-term exclusive
relationship between GR-source states and bioprospectors. A multi-decade
exclusivity requirement in a concession agreement framework may not be a
desirable innovation policy for the global society or for the GR-source states
in particular.337 This is where a critical distinction must be made. Tradition-
ally, resource-rich states have used the concession agreement as part of a
single, larger policy related to the use of their resources and economic devel-
opment. 338 However, prospecting for oil, lumber, and ore can be different
from prospecting for genetic resources because the latter requires further re-
search and development before a marketable product is realized.339 Hence, in
333. Samoff Interview, supra note 328.
334. GRAIN-2, supra note 39.
335. Id.; see, e.g., Ragavan, supra note 1, at 517 (arguing that such bilateral agree-
ments exploit the "naivety of indigenous people" of the potential economic
benefits of the genetic resources and the associated traditional knowledge).
336. GRAIN-2, supra note 39.
337. Sarnoff Interview, supra note 328 (explaining that, for example, the costs to
innovation created by the Bayh-Dole Act's transfer of upstream rights to uni-
versities that entered into exclusive licensing arrangements was seen as detri-
mental to innovation).
338. See Hyde, supra note 177, at 862 (characterizing the concession agreement as a
"international economic development agreement"); Delmon, supra note 170, at
251 (stating that concession agreements are "hardly distinguishable from a de-
velopment plan").
339. Ragavan, supra note 1, at 515 (noting that once the bioprospectors identify a
biological sample with the desired characteristics, it is subject to experimenta-
tion, appreciation of the resources, and investigation to understand its useful
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contrast to traditional prospecting, bioprospecting implicates innovation pol-
icy as well as resource-use policy. A bioprospecting concession agreement
that confers multi-decade long exclusivity to a single commercial entity, even
if only for the life of a patent, may be highly detrimental to overall innova-
tion by stifling subsequent and/or competitive research and development by
other potential actors. Therefore, long-term exclusivity in the bioprospecting
context may "give away too much to industry to the detriment of developing
countries and society generally."340
These two considerations of permanent sovereignty and long-term ex-
clusivity are certainly not an exhaustive list, but they are illustrative of the
practical application shortcomings of the concession agreement framework in
the bioprospecting context. Resolving each of these considerations is cer-
tainly beyond the scope of this paper, which seeks only to lay the foundation
and explain the advantages of the concession agreement framework in the
bioprospecting context over other legal mechanisms. It is important that in
expanding the various legal mechanisms to prevent biopiracy, the strengths
and the weaknesses of each legal mechanism be fully explored and under-
stood. This section of the paper began this process of assessing the practical-
ity of employing the concession agreement framework as a legal mechanism
to defend against the injustice and unfairness of biopiracy.
V. CONCLUSION
Bioprospecting will be a north star of our country's development.
-Rodrigo Gamez341
This paper examined the propriety of employing the concession agree-
ment framework as a legal mechanism to help defend against biopiracy.
Fundamentally, a concession agreement is a type of private agreement that
bioprospectors and GR-holders have used in the past to prevent misappropri-
ation of the GR/TK and to create equitable benefit-sharing regimes.342 How-
ever, as it has been illustrated, the unique characteristics of the
bioprospecting paradigm may require a unique form of private agreement.
After thorough analysis, the concession agreement framework should be that
unique form.
characteristics); see also id. at 518 (opining that due to the subsequent research
and development that must be conducted, it is difficult to assess the correct
value of the genetic resources during the private agreement negotiation).
340. Sarnoff Interview, supra note 328.
341. Rodrigo Gamez Lobo is the president of the Costa Rica's National Institute of
Biodiversity ("INBio") headquartered in Santo Domingo de Heredia, Costa
Rica.
342. See generally Kremers, supra note 5, at 34-37 (describing various examples of
private, prospecting agreements and highlighting the obstacles and concerns in
addressing the biopiracy controversy).
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Professor Asante's closing comments in his influential work on perma-
nent sovereignty and concession agreements succinctly sets forth the core
argument of this paper:
A state has the power to control and use its natural wealth and
resources. It may thus enter into binding agreements for the de-
velopment of its natural wealth and resources. In the exercise of
this power, it is obligated to act in accordance with recognized
principles of international law ... and with due regard for existing
legal rights or interests, with adequate, prompt and effective
compensation.43
GR-source states have the power to control and use their genetic re-
sources. Therefore, GR-source states can enter into binding agreements with
bioprospectors via a bioprospecting concession agreement. In this endeavor,
GR-source states are obligated to comply with TRIPS and CBD giving due
regard to the legal rights and interests of the indigenous communities who
are the true custodians, guardians, and owners of the genetic resources. At
the same time, GR-source states can work to formulate equitable benefit-
sharing regimes that provide for "prompt and effective compensation" to in-
digenous communities, and additionally, promote the development of their
countries. In effectuating objectives aimed at preventing biopiracy, this pa-
per strongly advocates that GR-holders apply the concession agreement
framework to bioprospecting in order to address the core issues of equity,
conservation, and preservation of the genetic resources and traditional
knowledge of the indigenous communities. By doing this, the concession
agreement framework can become part of a formidable arsenal of legal
mechanisms that empower GR-holders and GR-source states to fight the in-
justice and unfairness that transform bioprospecting into biopiracy.
343. Asante, supra note 174, at 867 (concluding that the concession agreement is the
most appropriate form of private agreements in the context of transnational
extraction industry).'
[Vol. XIV
